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ABSTRACT
 
This master's thesis defines the legacy ofepistemic rhetoric
 
from Greek to contemporary times. Epistemic rhetoric is defined as a
 
knowledge-discovering rhetoricin Classical times,and aknowledge-

creating rhetoric in contemporary times. Sociaily-constracted
 
discourse communities are the contemporary epistemological base
 
though which epistemic rhetoric is understood and expressed. These
 
discourse communities express themselves in both inclusionary and
 
exclusionary language,which hasimportantimplications in the
 
teaching ofcontemporary composition. The conclusion ofthis thesis
 
is that the foundational and exclusionary tension in discourse
 
communitieslimits composition studies,as well as knowledge
 
creation in general. TTie anti-foundational and inclusionary tension,
 
on the other hand,enables composition studies as well as the
 
creation ofknowledge.
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INTRODUCTION
 
Doesrhetoric create or discover knowledge? Composition
 
studies has inherited this dialectic in the form or epistemic rhetoric,
 
a rhetoric whose tradition and dialectic begin with Plato and the
 
Sophists. In Classical times Plato articulated his foundational belief
 
that rhetoric aided in the discovery of pre-existing archetypal truths.
 
The dominantcontemporary position,however,has been articulated
 
by various anti-foundationalists who believe that truth is socially
 
constructed by discourse communities. Both points of view are
 
embedded in epistemic rhetoric,a rhetoric thatis concemed with the
 
relationship between language and knowledge,yethow could these
 
positions differ so radically? In my thesis I will explore this dialectic
 
as a way to understand whatepistemic rhetoric is,whatepistemic
 
rhetoric has been,and how epistemic rhetoric affects contemporary
 
composition studies today.
 
Chapter one will explore the three dominantcontemporary
 
definitions ofepistemic rhetoric that map out its territory in
 
composition studies. Atone end is the anti-foundationalistJames
 
Berlin who defines epistemic rhetoric ideologically(Rhetoric and
 
Reality 165-179). Atthe other extreme is Richard Fulkerson who
 
allowsfor both foundational and anti-foundational definitions of
 
epistemic rhetoric(409-411). Covering the middle ground is
 
Kenneth Bruffee,along with other anti-foundational social
 
constructionists,who calls for exploratory interdisciplinary searches
 
for definitions in fields that are affected by social constructionism in
 
an effort to create a bibliographic base that would allow composition
 
studies tocome to consensus on a definition ofepistemic rhetoric
 
(Social Construction 773). Clarifying and analyzing the definitions
 
sought by Berlin,Fulkerson,and Bruffee will display the dialectic in
 
current thinking thatis inherentin any examination ofepistemic
 
rhetoric.
 
Chapter two will examine the historical roots of this dialectic
 
within epistemic rhetoric. Beginning with Plato's ideal ofepistemic
 
rhetoric(Bizzell,Herzberg 55-143),I will demonstrate that Plato's
 
argumentfor afoundational epistemic rhetoric was not completely
 
countered until the 19th century when Nietzsche wrote that rhetoric
 
is dissimulation(Miller 316-319 and Bizzell885-896). With Plato on
 
the side of"truth," and Nietzsche on the side of"lies," the p^ameters
 
ofthe the epistemic dialectic were finally defined. I will then show
 
that the modem response has been more towards Nietzsche's than
 
Plato's,since anti-foundational,socially-constmcted thought,that
 
believes thatknowledge can never transcend language,has evolved
 
as the dominantepistemic rhetoric(Berlin 183-184).
 
In the third and lastchapter,I willexplore how epistemic
 
rhetoric has influenced contemporary composition studies by
 
examining how epistemic rhetoric enables and how it limits
 
composition studies philosophically and pedagogically. In particular,
 
I will explore how epistemic rhetoric's idea ofdiscourse communities,
 
which is fraught with an inclusionary/exclusionary dialectic(Russell
 
53-56),has allowed composition studies to expand beyond the
 
traditional hegemony ofthe formalist or current traditional rhetoric
 
ofthe academic discourse community,and consequently has changed
 
not only the ways composition studies approaches writing,but the
 
waysin which composition studies thinks aboutknowledge and its
 
relationship to writing. The thesis thatI will arrive atin chapter
 
three is that the foundational and exclusionary tensions limit
 
composition studies pedagogically and epistemologically,whereas the
 
anti-foimdational and inclusionary tensions enable composition
 
studies to more effectively teach writing and thought.
 
Throughoutthese three chapters Twillexpose how the
 
rhetorical dialectic ordebate has changed. The Classical dialectic
 
revolved around the ethical and unethical uses oflanguage,whereas
 
the modem dialectic hasrevolved around the foundational and anti-

foundational epistemological nature oflanguage. This changed
 
dialectic from ethics to epistemology represents the change that
 
epistemic rhetoric has experienced within its legacy,alegacy in
 
which discourse changed from being the dressing ofthought to the
 
substance ofthoughtitself.
 
I think that it is important to understand that epistemic
 
rhetoric is not acommonlyrefeired to term in composition studies.
 
Therealm in which it can be defined is notcommonly understood;its
 
history is complex and extensive,the research is at times
 
incomprehensiblyjargon filled,its pedagogical and philosophical
 
applications can be confusing,and so consequently epistemic rhetoric
 
has lived in the shadow of social constuctionism,the dominant
 
contemporary expression ofepistemic rhetoric,but not the epistemic
 
rhetoric that has been known and used throughoutthe rhetorical
 
tradition. It would take more than a thesis,or even alarge book,to
 
deal effectively with all the problems that affect an understanding of
 
epistemic rhetoric. Despite that,I feel that a thesis like this is
 
needed,particularly in the wake ofJames Berlin's death,since he has
 
championed the epistemological and ideologicalinfluences of
 
epistemic rhetoric in composition studies more than any
 
contemporary scholar. I'm certainly notin a position to fill the void
 
that may occur because ofthe lack ofJames Berlin's scholarship, but
 
I hope thatI will contribute to a growing understanding ofepistemic
 
rhetoric,determining some ofits history,and showing how it both
 
enables and limitscomposition studies.
 
Lastly,let me apologize to the reader in advance for a difficulty
 
he or she may have in entering in to the discourse ofepistemic
 
rhetoric as presented in this thesis. In researching and writing this
 
thesis I have had to synthesize a complex,ever-evolving,jargon-

filled,and oftentimes contradictory discourse that,despite its call to
 
be inclusionary and readerfriendly,for the most partremains
 
reader hostile and exclusion^y. Ifthe reader finds himself or
 
herselffeeling lost or confused with the relatively inclusionary style
 
thatI am trying to use in thesis,I would ask the reader to spend a
 
few minutes reading Foucault,Nietztche,Plato,or any ofthe other
 
source material in order to appreciate the difficulty I have had in
 
attempting to present this often-times exclusionary research in both
 
an accurate and reader friendly manner.
 
Brad McClanahan
 
June 1996
 
CHAPTER ONE
 
WHATIS EPISTEMIC RHETORIC?
 
The belief that rhetoric either discovers or creates knowledge
 
has been part ofthe rhetorical tradition since the Sophists and Plato.
 
Contemporary epistemic rhetoric is the modem vehicle for that
 
rhetorical tradition, butthe dominantepistemological conclusions
 
today are contrary to the dominantepistemological conclusions in
 
Classical times. From Classical times,the legacy ofPlatonic thought
 
has dominated over Sophistic thought,and consequently rhetoric was
 
seen as an epistemic vehicle though dialectic to a transcendent
 
absolutist truth,also referred to as foundational,logocentric,or
 
universal truth. In contemporary times however,the thought of
 
socially constracted discourse communities has dominated over the
 
absolutist thought,and consequently rhetoric is seen as an epistemic
 
vehicle through dialectic to relative socially constructed truths,also
 
referred to as anti-foundational,post-positivist,or relative trath.
 
Simplistically put.Classical epistemic rhetoric has represented
 
foundational thought,discovered knowledge,whereas contemporary
 
epistemic rhetoric has represented anti-foundational thought,
 
created knowledge.
 
The terminology that surrounds composition studies has
 
flourished in the last thirty years,and the appearance ofepistemic
 
rhetoric,both as a term and as a way ofknowing,writing,and
 
teaching,is notan exception.^ Some would say this explosion of
 
terminology is a sign that composition studies is experiencing a
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Kuhnian crisis and the new terminology reflects a paradigm shift in
 
the making. Others would say that the new terminology is due to the
 
creation and expansion ofnew and divergent discourse communities
 
thathave expanded awareness beyond the legacy oftraditional
 
scholarship. And still others would putitin therealm ofpolitical
 
dialectic. I believe that all these positions are valid since
 
composition studies,seen from a meta-historical perspective,is a
 
young field in the process ofdefining itself to others and to itself. In
 
such a young field many new terms do not survive for more than one
 
published article. Epistemic rhetoric is not one ofthose terms.
 
Epistemic rhetoric has alegacy behind it. Even so,in a field of
 
expanding terminology,it is hard to define epistemic rhetoric,
 
particularly because ofthe frequently impenetrable quality ofthe
 
research and writing. Consequently there are many logistical and
 
philosophical problems in defining the theories and practices of
 
composition studies,including the defining ofepistemic rhetoric, but
 
three problemsin particular stick outfor me.
 
Problems in Defining
 
First of all,there's the problem of whether composition studies
 
is an independentfield or not. Being an independentfield thatcan
 
claim the legacy ofrhetoric and stand firmly within the English
 
studies tripod oflinguistics,literature,and composition makesa huge
 
difference in the process ofself-definition. Stephen North,in his
 
book The Making ofKnowledge: Portrait ofan Emerging Field,makes
 
an excellent argumentfor composition studies being a field,but he,
 
like Edward J. Corbett,concedes thatcomposition studies is a young
 
field. Both North and Corbett place its beginning in 1963 at the
 
Conference on College Composition and Communication. Corbett
 
chooses 1963 because ofthe common useofthe word rhetoric that
 
began during thatCCCCconference(Corbett445). North chooses
 
1963 because ofthe Braddock Study,which essentially claimed that
 
weknew nothing about to research and teach composition
 
effectively,and also because composition was made a third leg in the
 
academic reform movement with literature and linguistics(North
 
15). The paradigm had shifted pedagogically and rhetorically,and
 
composition became"Composition Studies"(North 12-17). Without
 
entering into further details ofthis debate,which still continues,my
 
position for this thesis is thatcomposition studies is an independent
 
field and in defining epistemic rhetoric I will claim the legacy of
 
rhetoric.
 
Secondly,we have the problem that each definition represents
 
a paradigm,and the paradigm must be agreed upon before an
 
understanding can take place ofthat definition within that paradigm.
 
According to Thomas Kuhn,changes occur in science,nature,and in
 
other academic and political fields when a paradigm no longer
 
answers research questions adequately(Kuhn 109). As North,
 
Corbett,and others have written,this shift began for composition
 
studies in 1963 with such university crises as open enrollment and a
 
general questioning ofacademic authority. And as Maxine Hairston
 
writes,who traces this period ofsocial upheaval that has parallelled
 
the pedagogicaland philosophical growth ofcomposition studies,
 
Kuhn's book was also published in 1963(Hairston 76). Although
 
some will argue about whatstage in the shift composition studies is
 
in,Isimply wantto point out that my argumentfor an epistemic
 
rhetoric presupposes the nature ofparadigm shifts in all fields of
 
study. Given the existence ofparadigm shifts, defining epistemic
 
rhetoric in a time ofchange is an unwieldly, yet necessary,task.
 
Composition studies is a young field,definitions are still very
 
slippery,particularly as seen from an anti-foundational point of
 
view,and the term epistemic rhetoric is not acommonly used term
 
in the field.
 
Thirdly,and related to the problem ofchanging paradigms,is
 
Foucault's concept ofan epwtme,the epistemological field. Just as
 
understanding Kuhn's now widely accepted theory ofparadigm shifts
 
is importantin trying to understand the nature ofdefinitions in a
 
young,independent,and changing field,it is also importantin
 
understanding the epistemological shiftfrom foundational to anti-

foundational thoughtthat has occurred in the Western tradition and
 
consequently in epistemic rhetoric. I will discuss the epistemological
 
shiftin more detail in chapters two and three, but underlying the
 
process ofdefining epistemic rhetoric is Foucault's idea ofthe
 
episteme,the ever shifting epistemological field,the fabric of
 
thought and reality itself. Foucaultfeels that the Western episteme
 
began to change in the 19th century,Nietzsche's century(The Order
 
ofThings 304-305). Many others,such as Knoblauch and Brannon,
 
feel thatthe shiftin the Western episteme began during the 17th
 
century and the Scientific Revolutioil(4), I will argue with Foucault
 
thatthe paradigm shift occurredin theepisteme most definitively in
 
the 19th century.In the 19th century.Classical thoughtnolonger
 
represented our emerging modem and post-modem thought,orin
 
other words a Kuhnian paradigm shift was occurring. The rhetorical
 
debate in this episteme,and the consequent paradigm shift,tumed
 
from the ethical and unethical uses oflanguage to foundational and
 
anti-foundational views on language and reality. Composition studies
 
and current epistemic rhetoric have grown up during,and out of,this
 
anti-foundational shiftin the episteme and so it willinherently
 
affectepistemic rhetoric's definition. These issues ofdefinition will
 
become clearer towards the end ofthe chapter.
 
A Definition ofEpistemicRhetoric
 
Before I give the definition ofepistemic rhetoric thatI will be
 
using in this thesis, allow me to say that understanding how Icame
 
up with the definition is almost as important as the definition itself.
 
There are so many paradigms in the act ofdefining,and so many
 
mbrics used within those paradigms,and these paradigms and
 
rubrics reveal how composition studies defines itself as a whole. In
 
other words,I will give my definition ofepistemic rhetoric,butthen
 
I will take the rest ofchapter one to demonstrate how I had to come
 
up with that definition and why that process ofdefining is inherent
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to an understanding ofepistemic rhetoric. In short,epistemic
 
rhetoric embodies the dialectical nature ofthe continual human
 
search for truth and knowledge which includes the search for
 
definitions.
 
1 define epistemic rhetoric as follows:
 
Epistemic rhetoric is a rhetoric that assumes and teaches that
 
language is the basis for all human understanding of
 
knowledge,whetherfoundational or anti-foundational,and that
 
effective use and understanding oflanguage leads to the
 
creation or discovery ofknowledge,eitherfrom orfor the self,
 
orfrom or for the society. Effective use and understanding of
 
epistemic rhetoric would emphasize the dialectical,as well as
 
the formalistic,nature oflanguage and knowledge in relation to
 
the self,society,and whatis perceived to be reality.
 
1 don't believe that my definition ofepistemic rhetoric is
 
definitive, but1 hope that it will be comprehensive,as we will see
 
when we analyze it at the end of this chapter. Asis evident,this
 
definition reflects the epistemic legacy ofboth foundational and anti-

foundational beliefs. A foundational definition ofepistemic rhetoric
 
may have been dominantin Classical times, butin contemporary
 
times the dominantusage ofepistemic rhetoric reflects an anti-

foundational epistemology, which,as Joseph Petraglia asserts,is
 
completely construed with social constructionism.
 
Petraglia writes,"a social constructionist argues thatknowledge
 
is created,maintained,and altered though an individual's interaction
 
with and within his or her'discourse community'"(Petraglia 38).
 
Simply by understanding thatknowledge is socially constructed,
 
immediately there are problems in definitively defining epistemic
 
rhetoric. Since the definition is based on the ongoing dialectic within
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a diverse and everchanging discourse community ofcompositionists
 
who align themselves with epistemic rhetoric,the definition will
 
continue to change over time. According to Schiappa,"rhetoric's
 
epistemic status,and the emerging controversy concerning the utility
 
of social constructionism..." are two ofthe hottest topics in
 
composition studies today(Schiappa 401). And so,in a sense,this
 
thesis is marking my entrance into the epistemic discourse
 
community. This means thatin defining epistemic rhetoric,I will
 
have to define what the currentcommunity understands it to be,and
 
in the course ofthe thesis,I will also define what it means to me as a
 
member ofthatcommunity.
 
Definition Paradigms
 
Having given the above definition ofepistemic rhetoric,I
 
would now like to explore why definitions,temiinologies,and
 
taxonomiesin composition studies are hard to determine.
 
In searching through the literature on whatI took to be
 
epistemic rhetoric,and the taxonomizing ofcomposition studies as a
 
whole,I have come up with six different paradigms that are used to
 
define composition studies,three of which produce clarity at the
 
meta-level,and three which produce confusion because they neglect
 
the meta-level. The three paradigms that neglect the meta-level are:
 
(1)Pedagogical definitions,(2)Procedural definitions,and(3)
 
Epistemological definitions. The three atthe meta-level are: (1)
 
Theory-based definitions,(2)Ideologically-based definitions,and(3)
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Exploratory definitions. These last three try to integrate otherfields
 
ofstudy into composition studies so thatenough information can
 
existfor an eventual consensus to take place on whatis epistemic
 
rhetoric. Ofthese six paradigms,the theory based definition,
 
championed by Fulkerson,and ideological based definitions,
 
championed by Berlin are the mostpowerful,as we will see later in
 
this chapter. The exploratory definitions championed by the
 
interdisciplinary bibliographic work ofKenneth A.Bruffee and many
 
others,are also helpful in understanding epistemic rhetoric at a
 
meta-level,butthey resultin an incompleteness. Although I have
 
mostheavily relied on Fulkerson and Berlin for my definition of
 
epistemic,each ofthe these definition paradigms will have to be
 
explored to understand the dilemma in defining epistemic rhetoric.
 
Before exploring the three meta-level paradigms,I must
 
critique the shortcomings ofthe three paradigmsfor definitions that
 
neglect the meta-level. The three paradigms of pedagogy,procedure,
 
and epistemology can notdojustice to a definition ofepistemic
 
rhetoric because they are only looking ata piece ofthe whole. The
 
pedagogical definition only looks at how an epistemic rhetoric might
 
be taught. A precedural definition ofepistemic rhetoric only looks at
 
how composition texts are created and whether we stress the process
 
or the product more in the procedure. The epistemological definition
 
only looks at whatcounts as knowledge or how knowledge is made.
 
Although these three paradigms are importantin
 
understanding epistemic rhetoric,and I will refer to them both in
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this chapter and in chapter three,they do not provide a clear and
 
complete definition ofepistemic rhetoric. I believe that epistemic
 
rhetoricians would agree that epistemic rhetoric is minimally a
 
philosophy,meaning a search for tmth and knowledge through
 
language,and at best a theory,meaning a set of principles about
 
truth and its relation to language and the best methods to implement
 
these principles. Ifeither the philosophical or theoretical views are
 
true,then simple pedagogical,procedural,or epistemological
 
definitions ofepistemic rhetoric can not give us acomplete
 
definition.
 
I'll now expand on this assertion by examining the three meta-

level definition paradigms;Bruffee's exploratory approach,Berlin's
 
ideological approach,and Fulkerson's theoretical approach.
 
Meta-LevelDefinitions
 
After many years ofconfusion abouthow an epistemic rhetoric
 
should be defined and understood,Kenneth Bruffee >vrote in 1986
 
that the solution can come through the interdisciplinary exploration
 
of bibliographic definitions(Social Construction 773). In 1988James
 
Berlin posits thatideological definitions are the mostaccurate and
 
helpful in understanding the rise ofan epistemic rhetoric(Rhetoric
 
and Ideology 477). Richard Fulkerson, writing in 1990,argues that a
 
theory based definition that separates the ends and the meansis the
 
most helpful(Fulkerson 409). In order to understand epistemic
 
rhetoric, we mustfirst understand how Braffee,Berlin,and
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Fulkerson would go about defining epistemic rhetoric. From the
 
disparities and similarities in their perspectives,an understanding of
 
epistemic rhetoric will emerge. I'll start with the state ofdefinitions
 
that Bruffee and others inherited when he called for his exploratory
 
approach,and then wecan move chronologically to Berlin and finally
 
to Fulkerson.
 
Bruffee's Exploratory Approach
 
As composition studies moves awayfrom the formalistic
 
writing classroom,many compositionists search for pedagogy,
 
procedures,and epistemology thatrespond progressively to the
 
changes in the university writing classroom. Many scholars like
 
Kenneth Bruffee havefound themselves to be part ofa growing
 
group of"social constructionists," a group that advocates pedagogy
 
thatincludes collaborative learning,procedures that stress process
 
over product,and an epistemology based on the concept ofdiscourse
 
communities that sees the writing process as knowledge creating
 
instead knowledge discovering. Mostimportantly,Bruffee sees this
 
emerging rhetoric as asocially-constructed,knowledge-creating
 
rhetoric,an epistemic rhetoric on the anti-foundational side of
 
theepistemological dialectic. As an emerging discourse community
 
within the shifting paradigm ofcomposition studies,self-definition
 
for this group becomes difficult. Bruffee attempts to offer a solution
 
to the problem ofdefinitions by exploring the existing
 
interdisciplinary bibliographic sources that bring light about
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epistemic rhetoric to the young field ofcomposition studies.
 
Essentially Bruffee,as one ofthe most prominentcompositionistsin
 
this diverse group ofexplorers,is trying to take definitionsfrom the
 
disciplines ofphilosophy,anthropology,linguistics, politics,the
 
sciences and use thatresearch to bring composition studies to
 
consensus on the definition and role ofa social constructionist
 
epistemic rhetoric. Although this exploratory approach is helpful,it
 
also problematizes the concept ofepistemic rhetoric. Bruffee states
 
the problem like this:
 
During the past75 years the benefits ofthe debate in
 
cognitive terms abouteducation - with its ethnocentric
 
emphasis on universals and absolutes,its endless circularity
 
oscillating between the'subjective'and the'objective,'its
 
alienating emphasis on individuality,and its need to
 
continually ignore,suppress,or side step the unbridgeable
 
abyssinherentin our cognitive vocabulary between learner
 
and whatis learned - has become increasingly dubious. (Social
 
Construction 778-779)
 
In other words,an interdisciplinary approach is necessary to
 
deal with the paradigm shiftfrom foundational to anti-foundational
 
thought,from the universal to the^social constructionist thought. So
 
whodoes Bruffee look to in order to bring clarity to this emerging
 
group ofsocial constructionists? Bruffee explores the scholarhship of
 
Foucaultin history and philosophy,Geertzfrom anthropology,Kuhn
 
from the theory ofscience.Burkefrom rhetoric,and the philosophers
 
Rorty,Dewey,Heidegger,and Wiggenstein(773-779). Jim Corder,
 
whoexplores many ofthe same sources,would add other social
 
constructionist scholars such as Kinneavy,Kitzhaber,Ong,and
 
Perelman. Corder writes,"We have not yet seriously begun to
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explore rhetoric as a portal to other fields. Rhetoric may not be able
 
to dofor other fields what their own methodologies have not done,
 
butrhetoric can help us see thingsin other fields in new ways,and
 
when wecan seein new ways,we may think new thoughts"(167).
 
Starting in the mid-seventies,influenced primarily by social
 
constructionist thoughtfrom other fields ofstudy like politics and
 
linguistics, many composition practioners besides Bruffee and Corder
 
began to explore "rhetoric as a portal" because they saw that their
 
thinking aboutlanguage's relation to knowledge,as seen in the
 
writing process,had changed from their classical and/orformalist
 
training. Epistemic rhetoric in these situations was described in
 
pedagogical,procedural,and epistemological methodologies that tried
 
to get at the core of this emerging composition philosophy,a
 
philosophy emergingfrom exploring interdisciplinary research. Hie
 
definitions atfirst were confused,but eventually,they began to take
 
shape under the social constructionist epistemology. Yet underlying
 
all these definitions was the paradigm shift,an acknowledgement
 
that all the old words no longer described the new ideas. The
 
definitions were representative ofthe crisis in composition studies as
 
a whole,the old no longer answered the new,the traditional fell
 
shortofthe contemporary. Socially constructed thought and the
 
heed for dialectic in the new discourse communities,academic and
 
otherwise,could not be recognized in the existing language.
 
Epistemic rhetoric,as a defined territory, was a thoughtin the
 
process ofcreation,just as the language around it was in the process
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ofcreation or atleast ofredetinition. As the thinking has become
 
clearer,so has the language and vice versa,and so within the process
 
of social construction many traditional definitions were tried and
 
discarded because the chronological baggage on these words proved
 
nolonger effective to express contemporary thought. For example,
 
discourse no longer meantthe clothing ofthought,but thoughtitself.
 
Before Bruffee's attempts to bring clarity to composition in an
 
emerging interdisciplinary understanding ofsocial constructionism,
 
there were many other epistemic pioneersin composition studies.
 
I'd like to look atfive compositionists that were involved in this
 
exploratory process.
 
In 1978 Richard E.Young writes in Research on Composing in a
 
chapter entitled "Paradigms and Problems: Needed Research in
 
Rhetorical Invention," that composition's current-traditonal paradigm
 
is in crisis(29-31). Using the terminology and the point ofview of
 
Thomas Kuhn's Structure ofScientific Revolutions,Young argues that
 
the current traditional composition paradigm can not answer the
 
questions that have been posed by such changes in academia and
 
society such as the open university,feminist thought,and multi­
culturalism. A crisis like this mustchange the paradigm awayfrom
 
formalism to a new rhetoric. Atthe time of writing.Young does not
 
use the term epistemic rhetoric, but he does outline a possible action
 
plan. In order to respond to a crisis in the paradigm.Young argues
 
that we mustlook both back toward the rhetorical tradition and
 
forward to a new rhetoric. The thread ofthe rhetorical tradition,an
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episteriiic rhetoric,has been lost to him as a student ofliterature, but
 
Young knows that through research this rich legacy will provide the
 
epistemologicalframework for a new rhetoric.
 
In 1980Kenneth Dowst wrote a chapter entitled,"The
 
Epistemic Approach: Writing,Knowing,and Learning," in the book
 
EightApproaches to Teaching Composition. Dowst uses the
 
communications triangle to define epistemic rhetoric,arguing that
 
epistemic rhetoric favors the writer over language,and reality.
 
Defined in that hierarchial order of writer,language,and reality,
 
composition is then seen as a way ofmaking knowledge through
 
writing because the writer's language is reflecting the socially
 
constructed nature of truth. Dowst goes on to show that the
 
epistemic approach,a knowledge creating approach,is an
 
improvement over "formalist,""referential," or"expressive"
 
approaches to composition(66-68). Typical ofearly definitions, this
 
is more a pedagogical definition than a meta-level definition as
 
Berlin and Fulkerson will later offer. Butas Bruffee writes,
 
"Terminology proliferates" in a paradigm shift, particularly when
 
exploring for interdisciplinary pillars(Social Construction 773).
 
Exploring the usefulness of that terminology has been one of the
 
mostimportantroles of this exploratory group ofcomposition
 
scholars,and Dowst's language includes the first use ofthe term
 
epistemic rhetoric. Epistemic rhetoric for Dowstsuggests a
 
knowledge making,not knowledge discovering,rhetoric. Epistemic
 
rhetoric consequently expresses the contemporary bias for an anti­
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foundationalrhetoric based on socially-constructed knowledge
 
creation.
 
According to Ann Berthoffin The Making ofMeaning:
 
Metaphors,Models,andMaximsfor Writing Teachers,composition
 
practitioners mustsearch to integrate theory and practice. In other
 
words,they mustcreate a "praxis" that"can develop an authentic
 
pedagogy ofknowing"(19). Berthoffconsequently is within this
 
exploratory group that is trying to move beyond the procedural,
 
pedagogical,and epistemological paradigms to an inclusive epistemic
 
theory. In her opinion,"the best way to keep theory lively and
 
practice responsive is to have in mind models and metaphors to
 
remind teachers and their students ofwhatisinvolved in learning
 
and teaching thecomposing process"(5). Berthoff goes on to
 
demonstrate how metaphorical thinking makes an understanding of
 
models and maximsfrom which to teach,thus enhancing the
 
metaphorical position oflanguage that is used by many epistemic
 
rhetoricians. Coming outofone ofthe first philosophical, yet
 
procedural,statements created in composition studies,namely
 
"process over product," Berthoff,as a social constructionist, would not
 
side with the world view that truth pre-exists language. Berthoff
 
claims that her roots are in LA.Richards and "his convention that the
 
classroom is the philosophical laboratory"(18),as well as the
 
linguistic,rhetorical,and philosophical views ofBurke,Vygotsky,
 
Cassirer,Friere,Langer,Sapir,Whitehead,and Tolstoy. Written in
 
the years preceeding and including 1981,Berthoffs book is more ofa
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callfor an epistemic rhetoric that a definition ofit(107). This is
 
typical ofcompositionists writing in the 1970s and early 1980s.
 
JanetEmig is also in this early group. Like many
 
compositionists,Emig turns to Vygotsky for answers to language's
 
relationship to thought,and hence the title ofher 1983 book.The
 
Web ofMeaning: Essays on Writing,Teaching,Learning,and
 
Thinking. Asliterary students have been influenced by psychology,
 
so havecomposition studies,particularly in search for anti-

foundationalepistemologies thatcould reflect the reality ofthe
 
contemporary writing class. The paradigm has been shifting,and
 
many composition teachers have become open to new theories to
 
explain contemporary problems. Forinstance,Edward M.White
 
writes in "Post-Structural Literary Criticism and the Response to
 
'Student Writing,""Although teachers are a rather conservative lot,
 
they seem to have responded to post-structural theory with a
 
surprising calm,even general acceptance..."(White 186). The anti-

foundationalepistemologyin post-structuralism has come to the
 
forefront ofcomposition just as social constructionistrhetoric has.
 
Just as Classical logocentric rhetoric or the formalism of Aristotle is
 
not acceptable in a writing classroom,so isn't the current-traditional
 
pedagogy. As we will see in chapters two and three,compositionists
 
have had to be open to new ways ofthinking and teaching.
 
Finally,Joseph Petraglia's exploratory work on the nature of
 
"rhetoric as epistemic," suggests that there are four processes that
 
provide the basis of social construction in composition(39). They are
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"Real entities('reality')include knowledge,beliefs,truths,and
 
selves... Allreality is arrived at by consensus... Consensus,and thus
 
knowledge is'discovered'solely through public discourse(rhetoric)...
 
Reality changes as consensus changes." This anti-foundational
 
epistemic rhetoric is typical ofthe dialectic against the legacy of
 
Classicalfoundational rhetoric as well as the social norms that it
 
contained including patriarchy and Euro-centrism. Composition
 
studies has grown up with the feminist and civil rights movements
 
and so Petraglia's inclusionary epistemic rhetoric, within this new
 
tradition,is responding to the exclusionary hegemony oftraditional
 
absolutist rhetoric and the typical white male ideas that it reified.
 
In these five exploratory attempts to define both epistemic
 
rhetoric and its contemporary vehicle ofsocial constructionism,a
 
trend appears,as Jim W.Corder suggests,to talk about"a new"
 
rhetoric or "the new"rhetoric"(162-163). I agree that this trend
 
exists, butI don't see epistemic rhetoric as"the new"rhetoric
 
because epistemic rhetoric has a legacy that goes back to the
 
dialectical opposition ofPlato and the Sophists. Although the
 
dialectical assumptions have changed from afoundational to an anti-

foundational epistemological base,this rhetoric remains epistemic
 
and consequently is not new. The epistemological conclusions may
 
be new,but the idea of a knowledge creating and/or discovering
 
rhetoric is not. The explorations ofBruffee and other
 
interdisciplinary social constructionists may make epistemic rhetoric
 
seem like it is new,but as Robin Vamum points out,this sort of
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"new"talk robs us ofour generations,our rhetorical legacy(39-40).
 
AsI will show in chapters two and three,this explofartory group has
 
still notcome to terms with the historical dialectic ofepistemic
 
rhetoric,and therefore using socialconstructionism as the definition
 
for Bruffee's idea ofan epistemic rhetoric does notrespond to the
 
meta-level definitional needs as effectively as the work of Berlin or
 
Fulkerson.
 
JamesBerlin'sIdeologicalApproach
 
James Berlin's work on rhetoric has broughtepistemic rhetoric
 
to the forefront ofcomposition studies more than any other single
 
contemporary scholar,and his work on composition theories in 1982,
 
1987,and 1988 has not overlooked the rhetoricallegacy. His
 
taxonomies havefocused on the ideological and epistemological
 
characteristics ofrhetoric,and since he himself was an anti-

foundational Marxist,his works have interpreted epistemic rhetoric
 
from a the social constractionist Marxist view.
 
Inherentin James Berlin's understanding and descriptions of
 
rhetorical theories is Kuhn's idea ofparadigm shifts as well as
 
Foucault's idea ofthe episteme. Berlin writes in his history of
 
writing instruction in the twentieth century entitled Rhetoric and
 
Reality,"While one particular rhetorical theory may predominate at
 
any historical moment,none remains dominant over time... the
 
difference has to do with epistemology"(3). Berlin documents how
 
epistemological assumptions and the episteme have changed in
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composition studies throughoutthe century,but mostimportantly
 
since the 1960s. Berlin writes in 1987 that,"In considering the
 
rhetorical theories ofthe period I have chosen epistemology rather
 
than ideology as the basis of my taxonomy"(6). Butone year later,
 
in his landmark article "Rhetoric and Ideology in the Writing Class,"
 
Berlin choses to taxonomize ideologically. Let's first look at the
 
epistemological taxonomy.
 
Berlin divides the rhetorical history of writing instruction in
 
Rhetoric andReality into three epistemological areas: objective,
 
subjective,and transactional. Theobjective rhetorical theory is a
 
positivistic rhetoric thatin a contemporary lightis seen as current-

traditional,formalist,or cognitive psychological. The subjective
 
rhetorical theory,because it sees knowledge comingfrom the
 
individual,is essentially expressivistic. Transactional rhetorical
 
theory,because it sees knowledgecomingfrom "an interaction ofthe
 
subject and object or ofthe subject and audience or even ofall the
 
elements - subject,object,audience,and language - operating
 
simultaneously,"(15)is essentially epistemic rhetoric.
 
Within the transactional or epistemic category,"Rhetoric exists
 
not merely so that truth can becommunicated: rhetoric exists so
 
that truth many be discovered...and constructed"(165). In other
 
words,Berlin recognizes that epistemic rhetoric enacts the
 
foundational/anti-foundational epistemological dialectic,the
 
Platonic/Nietzschean dialectic,that we will discuss in detail in
 
chapter two. Berlin asserts,"Epistemic rhetoric holds that language is
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the key to understanding the dialectical process involved in the
 
rhetorical act. Knowledge does not exist apartfrom language"(166).
 
Epistemic rhetoric consistsofboth Plato's dialectical discovery of
 
foundational definitions as well as discourse communities'
 
construction ofanti-foundational definitions. In "Rhetoric and
 
Ideology in the Writing Classroom," Berlin describes this dialectical
 
division within epistemic rhetoric as "psychological epistemic" on the
 
Platonic side,and "social epistemic"on the social constructionist or
 
discourse community side(489).
 
Berlin traces the roots of social-epistemic rhetoric, within the
 
the transactionalepistemology,in the 1950s and 1960s to Harold
 
Martins,Richard Ohmann,Kenneth Burke,and others,^d then in the
 
1970s and 1980s to Kenneth Pike,Alton Becker,Richard Young,
 
Kenneth Bruffee,Ann Berthoff,Paulo Friere,Hans Guth,Fredric
 
Jameson,Richard Rorty,MichelFoucault,David Bartholomae,Patricia
 
Bizzell,C.H.Knoblauch,Lil Brannon,and Maxine Hairston(Rhetoric
 
and Reality 165-189). What holds all these scholars,the emerging
 
epistemic rhetoric discourse community,together? According to
 
Berlin,what unifies them is a belief that:
 
Meaning emerges notfrom objective,disinterested,empirical
 
investigation,butfrom individuals engaging in rhetorical
 
discourse in discourse communities - groups organized around
 
the discussion of particular matters in particular ways.
 
Knowledge,then,is a matter of mutual agreement appearing as
 
a product ofrhetorical activity,the discussion,of a given
 
discourse community.(166-167)
 
As noted earlier,many ofthese epistemic rhetoriciansjust
 
listed,and whofollow this social constructionist pattern ofself­
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definition,are the same scholars that were part of whatI termed the
 
exploratory group. The beauty ofBerlin's analysis ofepistemic
 
rhetoric over the exploratory group's analysis,is that he sees it as
 
partofa rhetorical legacy as well as a rhetoric thatcan be defined
 
and understood through the meta-level ofideology. Ideology,like
 
theory or philsophy,acheives the desired meta-level,a meta-level in
 
this thesis meaning a composition approach that minimally takes in
 
to account pedagogy,epistemology,and procedure. Berlin also
 
understands,unlike the exploratory group who unite predominantly
 
around the social constructionist epistemology,that transactional
 
rhetoric,or epistemic rhetoric,can be seen from both foundational
 
and anti-foundational points of view,just as 1 have defined it. Berlin
 
ofcourse is in the anti-foundational camp.
 
In the 1988 article,"Rhetoric and Ideology in the Writing
 
Class," Berlin does not abandon epistemological taxonomies
 
altogether,but he decides thatideology clarifies the taxonomy
 
claiming that,"rhetoric is regarded as always already ideological"
 
(477). And as we will see when we analyze Fulkerson,Berlin,like
 
Fulkerson,saw thatin taxonmizing composition studies a meta-level
 
would have to be sought. Fulkerson chooses theory over philosophy,
 
whereas Berlin choosesideology over epistemology. Berlin explains
 
this evolution in his thinking by writing that ideology "addresses
 
three questions: Whatexists? Whatis good? Whatis possible?"
 
(479). Within thisframework,ideology includes and supercedes
 
epistemology because"Whatexists" takes on the question of what
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counts as knowledge. In addition,(and this is where the meta-level
 
clarity comesin)ideology encompasses both"Whatis good," which
 
addresses the ethical and aesthetic issues,and "Whatis possible,"
 
which addresses issues ofexpectation and power. In this article,
 
Berlin uses the same three categories,objective,subjective,and
 
transactional,but because he focuses more on the contemporary
 
pedagogical and procedural practices ofthese ideologies than on their
 
epistemological aspects,he calls objective rhetoric "cognitive
 
rhetoric," subjective rhetoric "expressionistic rhetoric," and
 
transactional rhetoric "social epistemic." Social epistemic,as we saw
 
with Bruffee and the exploratory group,is the dominant
 
contemporary expression ofepistemic rhetoric.
 
According to Berlin,social-epistemic rhetoric is"grounded in
 
language" and "is located in the relationship thatinvolves dialectical
 
interaction ofthe observer,the discourse community(social group)
 
in which the observer is functioning,and the material conditions of
 
existence"(488). Knowledge consequently is "an historically bound
 
social fabrication rather than an eternal and invariable phenomenon"
 
(489). Social-epistemic rhetoric consequently sees knowledge as
 
created,notdiscovered,but it is created within the same tradition as
 
the neo-Platonic epistemic rhetoric where knowledge is seen as
 
discovering an external and eternal truth. (Berlin calls this
 
psychological epistemic). Berlin adds that,"in studying rhetoric—the
 
ways discourse is generated—we are studying the ways in which
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knowledgecomes into existence,"(489)hence the continual
 
dialectical nature ofepistemic rhetoric.
 
Berlin mayrecognize the existence ofafoundational epistemic
 
rhetoric,but he sees it as almost obsolete in light ofthe current
 
historical dialectic and the current anti-foundational paradigm of
 
composition studies. Marginalizing foundational epistemic
 
rhetoricians divides the composition practitioners into those who
 
align themselves with Berlin's ideological and social constructionist
 
theory,and those who are not part ofthis discourse community.
 
Consequently he contributes,with his ideological definitions,to the
 
inclusionary/exclusionary tensions thatI will discuss in chapter
 
three. Although I personally like Berlin's point of view on epistemic
 
rhetoric,he can be very alienating to people who don't see rhetoric
 
and rhetorical taxonomies as inherently political. Butiflanguage has
 
always expressed power,whetherPlato's or Berlin's,the ideological
 
nature ofrhetoric's use can never beescaped. Berlin not only
 
understands the hegemonic aspects oflanguage,but he is able to
 
analyze and articulate linguistic hegemony. For compositionists who
 
would rather not have their hidden pedagogical,procedural,or
 
epistemological agendas analyzed,Berlin can be a threat. Butas
 
stated earlier,to understand Berlin we must appreciate that
 
paradigms shift,and the epwteme changes. Change can be a threat
 
to some compositionists,but mostrealize that change is one ofthe
 
only constants in the field.
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If Berlin may be accused of being too exclusive,Richard
 
Fulkerson may be accused of being too inclusive,and too much
 
mclusivity mayfail to provide definitions as well as mask the
 
conflictive nature in any discoiu-se community. Yet despite that,1
 
think that Richard Fulkerson has created the mostcomplete and
 
inclusive paradigm for understanding the current paradigmsin
 
composition studies.
 
Richard Fulkerson's Theory Approach
 
Bringing moreclarity to the taxonomizing ofcomposition
 
studies than anyone before him,Richard Fulkerson proposes,"as a
 
disciplinary paradigm that a'theory'ofcomposition would include
 
fourcomponents,ofwhich what1 once called a'philosophy'is only
 
the firstcomponent'(410). Although there is a breadth to the
 
exploratory social constructionist definitionsfrom scholars like
 
Bruffee,and there is an attractive power to the ideological definitions
 
ofBerlin,1 think Fulkerson's theory paradigm provides a schema
 
thatcan fully taxonomize any composition practice,notjustepistemic
 
rhetoric.
 
The first and the most definitive ofthe four componentsin
 
Fulkerson's theory based definition is "axiology," a value theory for
 
whatconstitutes good writing. The axiology is concerned with the
 
ends,whereas the next three components ofFulkerson's paradigm
 
are the means to achieving these ends. The means are procedural,
 
pedagogical,and epistemological. As was discussed earlier,the
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procedural componentconcerns how writers create texts or how they
 
should create texts. The pedagogical componentconcerns how a
 
teacher should design curriculum and what modes ofinstruction
 
would be the best. The epistemologicalcomponentconcerns what
 
counts as knowledge or how knowledge is made. Fulkerson
 
"maintain(s)that these four elements are both necessary and
 
sufficient for a theory ofcomposition"(411).
 
In differentiating the ends ofany composition theory from the
 
means to achieve those ends,Fulkerson's logic clarifies the muddled
 
approaches that were seen in both the exploratory and ideological
 
approaches,as well as the earliest approaches that used only one of
 
the components ofepistemology,procedure,or pedagogy,to define a
 
composition theory. Fulkerson,with his ends and means approach,
 
tries to prove that,"Composition studies has moved toward a
 
homogeneity ofpurpose within diversity of method"(411). In other
 
words.Composition practioners have reached a consensus on the
 
ends,but not the means to achieve those ends. Fulkerson asserts,
 
because ofa predominance ofsocial constructionists,that
 
compositionists have chosen the rhetorical axiology,the axiology that
 
privileges the reader. He asserts thatcomposition has moved away
 
from the formalist axiology that privileges text, the mimetic axiology
 
that privileges reality,and the expressivistic axiology that privileges
 
the writer. In other words,the significant disparities that continue
 
to exist concern process,pedagogy,and epistemology,and not
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axiology since the consensusin the 1980s and 1990s is for a
 
rhetorical, or externally based,axiology.
 
Fulkerson emerges with his ends and means theory after a
 
mountain ofresearch by scholars like Berlin,Bruffee,and others in
 
the exploratory group. Initially the procedural,pedagogical,and
 
epistemological pieces ofthe puzzle were studied and understood.
 
From these means,the ends could beexamined. Fulkerson's 1990
 
assertion ofacommonly practiced and understood end,a rhetorical
 
axiology,took twenty seven years from the Braddock report's
 
announcementin 1963 that weknew nothing about how to teach and
 
research writing.
 
Intellectually Fulkerson's end and means theory can be quite
 
satisfying since composition practioners can use Fulkerson's four
 
components to analyze and implementthe axiological,procedural,
 
pedagogical,and epistemological practices needed to teach a
 
theoretically consistent and meta-cognitive writing class. Yetin
 
practical and emotional terms there is a awkward cumbersomeness
 
in being so precise. Ideological terms,like the ones Berlin uses,seem
 
to fulfill a more basic need of description. There's something
 
unsatisfying in a Fulkerson-like answer to the question of,"What's
 
your composition theory?" A contemporary epistemic rhetorician
 
would answer something like this: "Well,I'm axiologically rhetorical,
 
thatis I privelege the reader over the writer,text,or reality. I'm
 
pedagogically environmental,that is to use Hillox's definition that is
 
essentially based on the structured workshop type of writing class
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(Hillox 20), I'm procedurally process oriented following the cognitive
 
psychology ofLindaFlower(Rhetoric and Ideology 481),and I'm
 
epistemologically a social constructionist." This many be an accurate
 
answer,butitjust doesn't have the power of,"I'm an epistemic
 
rhetorician." Hiat's concise,and somehow pleasing,even though its
 
incompleteness has led to many ofthe current misunderstandings in
 
composition theory and practice. Certainly Berlin's ideological
 
terminology has had that brevity.
 
Although Fulkerson's theory-based paradigm has not offered
 
brevity,it does allow for the inevitable and probable paradigm shifts
 
that will occur as composition studies grows as a field.
 
Compositionists will be able to define themselves within their means
 
and ends as those means changes to achieve thatend,or vice versa.
 
Epistemic rhetoric,as a term,remains more stable than many terms
 
in literature and composition. Takefor example the literary theories
 
of"structuralism" or "reader response'" These literary terms,one
 
older and one newer,represent paradigms ofcriticism that have
 
evolved or will evolve outofexistence. Is that all epistemic rhetoric
 
will become? Iffirmly established as acomposition theory,ideology,
 
or philosophy, will epistemic rhetoric only representa
 
compositionist's stancefrom the 1970s to the 1990s? Maybeso,but
 
I hope not. I'm not arguing that all theories are historically situated
 
and consequently do not have the ability to evolve,but theories that
 
do notrespond to a historical legacy,like the dialectic inherentin
 
epistemic rhetoric,tend to stagnate and disappear as the paradigms
 
32
 
shift. Yetifepistemic rhetoric is seen as an integral part ofthe
 
rhetorical legacy,as well as a rhetoric thatcan change with the times,
 
then it will survive as an inclusive and timeless term. Ifitremains a
 
term simply for social constructionist epistemology and pedagogy,
 
then it willfade away an an exclusive and historically stagn^itterm.
 
Judgingfrom the historical dialectic that we will examine in chapter
 
two,epistemic rhetoric is a language centered rhetoric whose
 
epistemology should be able to change with the times.
 
So now that we've examined the exploratory group,Berlin's
 
ideological approach,and Fulkerson's theoretical approach,it's time
 
to understand ifthe definition thatI earlier offered ofepistemic
 
rhetoric qualifies as both a complete composition theory and as a
 
rhetoric thatresponds to its historical legacy.
 
Analysis OfMyDefinition ofEpistemicRhetoric
 
My definition,once again,reads as follows:
 
Epistemic rhetoric -Epistemic rhetoric is a rhetoric that
 
assumes and teaches thatlanguage is the basis for all human
 
understanding ofknowledge,whether foundational or anti-

foundational,and thateffective use and understanding of
 
language leads to the creation or discovery ofknowledge,
 
eitherfrom or for the self,orfrom orfor the society. Effective
 
use and understanding ofepistemic rhetoric would emphasize
 
the dialectical,as well as the formalistic,nature oflanguage
 
and knowledge in relation to the self, society,and whatis
 
perceived to be reality.
 
Does this definition include the axiological end and the
 
procedural,pedagogical,and epistemological means that are
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necessary to be acomplete theory within Fulkerson's paradigm? In
 
an inclusive manner ofthinking,Ithink it does.
 
Although epistemology is attheforefront ofthis definition
 
instead of axiology,as Fulkerson would have it, the definition
 
nevertheless fits within the axiological definitions that would make it
 
a theory. In post-modem times the perspective on epistemic
 
rhetoric has axiologically priveleged the audience,reader,or society,
 
yet my definition also allows for axiologies that could privelege the
 
three other axiological components,the text,reality, or the writer.
 
An epistemic rhetorician's axiology would depend on his or her
 
epistemology,because within epistemic rhetoric there is an
 
inseparable dialectic between language and knowledge that would
 
affect an epistemic rhetorician's value theory of whatconstitutes
 
good writing or speaking. My definition has allowed for the breadth
 
ofthat axiological and epistemological legacy,whether it be a
 
Classical reality based axiology with afoundational and logocentric
 
epistemology,or a post-modem reader-based axiology with a anti-

foundational and socially constracted epistemology.
 
So,this definition includes Fulkerson's axiological and
 
epistemological components,but does it also include the procedural
 
and pedagogicalcomponents? In the mostinclusive manner of
 
thinking,again,I believe it does.
 
Fulkerson's procedural componentis the means by which
 
writers,or speakers in Classical times,go about creating texts. In
 
Classical times the procedure for creating texts was codified in
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Cicero'sDeInventione ; his five canons ofrhetorical composing being
 
invention,arrangement,style,memory and delivery(Bizzell,
 
Herzberg 195). Before Cicero,epistemic rhetoric also interpreted
 
procedure as the Socratic method,the search for definitions,
 
examining the formalistic nature ofspeech,and argumentation.In
 
post-modem times epistemic rhetoric hasinterpreted procedure
 
through various pre-writing procedures,which would include
 
analysis ofaudience and discourse communities,various draft
 
creation procedures,which emphasize the process over the product,
 
and various revision and editing procedures,which would include
 
peer editing and writers' workshops. Inherent in epistemic
 
rhetoric's procedure,whether Classical or post-modem,is the
 
dialectical nature oftext creation and my definition allows for this
 
procedural component.
 
Asfor the pedagogical component,post-modern epistemic
 
rhetoric has interpreted this through such teaching methodologies as
 
cooperative leaming and non-hierarchical group discussion. In
 
Classical times,according to H.I. Marrou,pedagogy would include the
 
use of both philosophical and rhetorical debate and dialectic(Marrou
 
194-205). Again,my definition ofepistemic rhetoric allows for these
 
pedagogical components.
 
And so now,in the mostinclusive terms,we have defined
 
epistemic rhetoric,as not simply a philosophy,a search for truth and
 
knowledge through language,but as a theory,a set of principles
 
abouttmth and its relation to language and the best methods to
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implementthese principles. As a theory,epistemic rhetoric's nature
 
is completely bound up in the endless dialectical pursuitfor
 
knowledge and wisdom through language,whether Classical or post-

modem.
 
The definition I have written for epistemic rhetoric defies the
 
ideological boundaries oftaxonomy that Berlin would want,and it
 
really gives no bibliographic context that Bruffee and the other
 
exploratory rhetoricians may desire, butIthink that it expresses an
 
inclusiveness that neither Berlin,Bruffee,orFulkerson would fault
 
given the rhetoricallegacy that it is trying to encompass. As we will
 
see in much more detail in chapters two and three,this definition
 
represents the dialectical nature ofepistemic rhetoric's history,a
 
history that must be appreciated properly to know and use epistemic
 
rhetoric as a timeless term.
 
C.H.Knoblauch,whose work pioneered the epistemological shift
 
that has been occuring in composition studies, states very clearly,"A
 
knowledge ofrhetoric can offer those who work in the theory and
 
teaching of writing two perspectives on their work that they
 
currently lack,the first philosophical,and the second historical"(27).
 
Now that we've looked at how epistemic rhetoric has affected
 
composition studies philosophically through the pursuitfor a
 
defintion, we'll nextlook at some of the history that creates
 
epistemic rhetoric's current dialectic. Understanding the definition of
 
epistemic rhetoric entails understanding its history,the purpose of
 
chapter two.
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CHAPTERTWO
 
THEHISTORICALDIALECTICOFEPISTEMIC
 
RHETORIC AS CREATED BYPLATO AND NIETZSCHE
 
Having defined epistemic rhetoric as itrelates to contemporary
 
composition studies,the question now arises ofhow composition
 
studies has gotten to the point where social constructionism is seen
 
as the dominantepistemic rhetoric theory. The contentiousness in
 
the contemporary definition,as seen in chapter one is representative
 
ofthe historical dialectic that hasformed our understanding of
 
epistemic rhetoric. In this chapterI will argue that the parameters
 
ofthis dialectic are defined by Plato in Classical times and Nietzsche
 
in the nineteenth century. Plato represents the definitive
 
foundational view on language and Nietzsche represents the
 
definitive anti-foundational view out of which grew the post-modem
 
bias for social constructionism. Plato and Nietzsche saw rhetoric in
 
epistemic terms as a vehicle for knowledge,but their assumptions on
 
whetherknowledge is discovered or created and to what truth it
 
related are entirely different. Plato claims that knowledge is
 
discovered and relates to an absolute truth. Nietzsche claims that
 
knowledge is created and relates only to our own dissimulation or
 
amoral untruth. With Plato on the side of"trath" and Nietzsche on
 
the side of"lies," their differences epitomize and define the continual
 
dialectic between truth and language inherentin epistemic rhetoric.
 
Underlying this argument that epistemic rhetoric has changed
 
from afoundational to an anti-foundational stance is Foucault's
 
37
 
concept ofthe episteme. Before discussing Plato,Nietzsche,and the
 
historical dialectic that took place in epistemic rhetoric between the
 
time periods of these two pivotal thinkers,let's revisitFoucault's
 
thoughton how this epistemologicallegacy has changed.
 
Foucault'sEpisteme
 
In The OrderofThings,MichelFoucault ponders the
 
epistemological dialectic in Western culture. Foucault uses the
 
Classical word episteme to describe the "epistemological field" of
 
Western Culture(xxii). Foucault's conceptofthe episteme is a post
 
modernist view ofknowledge that does not"describe the progress of
 
knowledge towards an objectivity"(xxii),but which displays the
 
basis ofa socially constructed field ofknowledgefrom which
 
Western culture emerged. Foucault continues:
 
Now,this archaeologicalinquiry has revealed two great
 
discontinuities in the episteme ofWestem culture; the first
 
inaugurates the Classical age(roughly half way through the
 
seventeenth century)and the second,at the beginning ofthe
 
nineteenth century,marks the beginning ofthe modem age.
 
(xxii)
 
In other words,Plato's Classical episteme was different than
 
Nietzsche's modem episteme. Yetthe episteme,according to
 
Foucault,that finally and irreversibly changed in Nietzsche's century,
 
the nineteenth,has its roots in Classical times. Plato and Socrates
 
assert that the episteme represents tme,or absolute,knowledge~a
 
knowledge based on archetypes that could only be known by
 
transcending human existence. Episteme in the Classical sense is
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contrasted to doxa,which to Socrates and Plato meant mere opinion.
 
The distinction between episteme and doxa has blurred in the post-

modem episteme,as socially-constructed anti-foundational thought
 
has emerged as the dominant episteme.,an episteme that has no
 
absolutes and believes that none have ever existed. The transition
 
between these episteme took time. My contention is that the
 
difference in this new emerging episteme was not understood by
 
philosophers and rhetoricians until Nietzsche,and then by modernist
 
and post-modernist work,alluded to in chapter one,thatfollowed
 
Nietzsche. Epistemic rhetoric,as a part ofthis rhetorical tradition,
 
has changed as the Classical episteme changed to the post-modem
 
episteme.
 
Another aspect ofFoucault's work that will become clearer as
 
we explore the historical dialectic in this chapter is the conceptof
 
hegemony. The epistemological dialectic has always been
 
contentious. In Classical times Plato's views won outover the
 
Sophists. Plato's views were hegemonic,and in their hegemony were
 
a threat as witnessed by the death ofSocrates. Similiarly,in post-

modem times,social constmctionistthoughtseems to be hegemonic
 
within rhetoric. I mention this now so that we can keep in mind that
 
dominance ofone thought over another does not mean that the less
 
dominantthought does not exist. Nietzsche felt the hegemony of
 
foundational thought when he tried to expand the rhetorical debate
 
beyond the Platonic and Aristotilian debate aboutthe ethical and
 
unethical uses oflanguage to the the Platonic and Sophistic debate
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aboutthe epistemological basis ofrhetoric, Foucault also feels the
 
hegemonic presence in his archaeological histories in that he often
 
studies more ofwhatis not mentioned than whatis mentioned.
 
Iam not going to take on the comprehensive archaeological
 
history in this thesis that Foucault made his life's work,butnow that
 
we have revisited Foucault's thought wecan continue forward in
 
examining the historical dialectic ofepistemic rhetoric. I will begin
 
my examining Plato's foundational thought. I then will examine the
 
anti-foundational thought ofNietzsche. I will conclude with a short
 
discussion ofthe rhetorical legacy thatcomposition studies is
 
dependent on and how thatlegacy influences us today.
 
Plato'sFoundationalThought
 
Plato defines truth and its relationship to language through
 
Socrates' voice in Plato's dialogues,mostnotably in thePhaedrus,
 
and the "Allegory ofthe Cave," as an unvarying absolute. Archetypes
 
ofthis absolute truth, orforms,are hidden,atleast metaphorically,
 
in acave,a cave whose existence weknow of before birth and which
 
we now mustrememberin order to transcend back to that heavenly
 
sanctuary of truth's archetypes. Beauty,particularly in rhetoric,
 
reminds us ofthis truth and so beauty must be sought after in order
 
to receive this truth. The transcendent truth exists and is accessible
 
to humans. The role ofthe philosopher, or the "lover of wisdom"as
 
well as beauty(Bizzell 142),is to bring humans to that secret and
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hidden knowledge. Rhetoric and language,therefore,discover pre
 
existing knowledge.
 
Rhetoric consequently is a virtuous pursuit. As Karen BurkeLe
 
Fevre writes in"A Platonic View ofRhetorical Invention,""Plato
 
maintains that virtues(truth,justice,love)do not exist in the
 
material world,but only in the mind and in the shape ofidealforms:
 
perfect prototypes ofthe natural world,forming an ideal pattern-

world ofa true,transcendent reality"(1). Ofcourse this sets up a
 
didactic binary ofgood and virtuous rhetoric against bad and
 
virtueless rhetoric,a binary whose relativity was hotly debated until
 
Nietzsche's definitive response.
 
This foundational definition ofarchetypes began the Classical
 
episteme,alegacy in which truth is accessed through language,but
 
is beyond language. Therefore rhetoric's place is to bring the
 
speaker,through language and dialectic,to the point where he orshe
 
can transcend the limitations oflanguage and receive the truth
 
through a mystical experience. Often called logocentric thought,
 
Platonic rhetoric hasinfluenced ourideas oflanguage straight
 
through to the Scientific Revolution and even beyond to the present
 
day. Forinstance,in composition is not the Expressivistidea thata
 
writer must discover his or her"voice" a transcendent view oftruth?
 
Otis M.Walter,a modem Platonic scholar,condenses Plato's
 
influence on the rhetoric in four ways:
 
(1) Ideas are the origins ofour values, (2) Mostofthe
 
manifestations ofour values are imperfectimitations ofthe
 
archetypal ideas,(3) Knowledge ofthe ideas can transform
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individuals and entire nations,and(4) Good communication
 
must be based on a transforming definition following the
 
principles already set out.(20-23)
 
From this point ofview,it is clear why Plato did notlike the
 
poets and the Sophists,the anti-foundationalists ofPlato's time.
 
Their beliefs,or doxa,manipulated Plato's truth,a truth of
 
archetypes,a truth that Plato felt the Sophists and the poets had no
 
conception of,and therefore had noright tospeak and write about.
 
Plato's hegemonic beliefis that philosophy should rule over rhetoric
 
and notrhetoric over philosophy,as the Sophists and the poets
 
would have it(Briggs 92). Plato is particularly concerned with the
 
"transforming" value ofknowledge which leads to a Classical dialectic
 
between the ethical and unethical uses oflanguage.
 
Plato's dialogues try to create a touchstone of moral absolutism
 
against the moralrelativism that he perceived in the Sophists ofhis
 
time. Toquotefrom Bizzell and Herzherg'sT^e Rhetorical Tradition,
 
"Plato views the Sophists as moral relativists who therefore have no
 
reason notto be manipulative,deceitful, or downrightcorrupting in
 
their use ofdiscourse. ButPlato sees himselfas didactic, not
 
manipulative,using discourse to shape his audience for its own good"
 
(56). Plato believes thatthe rhetoricians mustknow the truth to be
 
able to use the truth in a rhetorical situation. Rhetoric's ability to
 
persuade must be used to convince people ofthe Truth,not of a
 
relative truth, which Plato believed the Sophists practiced.
 
Persuasion to truth is good rhetoric,Platonic rhetoric, whereas
 
persuasion to doxa is bad rhetoric,or Sophistic rhetoric.
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ThusPlato defines the long Classical and contemporary debate
 
aboutthe ethical and unethical uses oflanguage. Many philosophers
 
and rhetoricians between the time ofPlato and Nietzsche debated
 
Plato's idea ofthe transforming nature ofethical rhetoric, as well as
 
the foundational premises ofabsolute truth, butthey always need
 
relative arguments. Underlying this debate is notonly Nietzsche's
 
idea of dissimulation,(thatis,thatlanguage is a "lie," no truth can
 
existin language,language can never be escaped,and therefore there
 
is no truth),but also the will to power and the will to truth, all of
 
which we will discuss later.(Briefly explained, will to poweris the
 
basic human drive by which individuals try to subjugate others in
 
order to prove that their beliefs or accomplishments are the most
 
worthy. Will to truth is"the desire to locate truth in something other
 
than discourse"(Bizzell,Herzberg 1126).) Plato's dialectic with the
 
Sophists was notcompletely understood until Nietzsche responded to
 
the unstated and underlying assumptions behind Platonic
 
foundational belief: Ifrhetoricc^deceive for"good"and for "bad,"
 
then rhetorical language mustin itselfbe deceptive. In other words,
 
how do weknow the truth when we can use language not only to
 
deceive others for their own good,but also to deceive ourselves?
 
Platonic epistemic rhetoric chose to overlook this issue,and chose
 
instead to debate the ethical and unethical uses oflanguage.
 
Nietzsche saw the idea ofdeception behind this ethical and unethical
 
debate and this pushed him to declare his anti-foundational beliefs
 
in response to Plato's foundational claims. As Foucault wrote,the
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episteme,notjust the doxa,has changed. Wecan believe ourselves
 
outof being deceived,but we can't think our way out of being
 
deceived.
 
Take,for example,the discussion on love in Plato'sPhaedrus.
 
In thePhaedrus Socrates defines good rhetoric as what Nietzsche
 
would call dissimulation. Plato shows Socrates defining love with his
 
studentPhaedrusfrom three rhetorical points of view; from the
 
Sophist Lysias';from a Sophist-type monologue by Socrates,and
 
finally,by an exemplary dialectic that purportedly lifts Phaedrus up
 
to Socrates'level ofunderstanding. Each ofthese rhetorical
 
discussions are based,as in Plato's Gorgias,on the binary ofdoxa
 
and episteme;but only in the third dialectic does Socrates express
 
that his persuasion is for a truthful good. Persuasion to truth,or
 
episteme, according to Socrates,is the only ethical or good rhetoric,
 
a rhetoric that mustinfluence the soul to transcendent trutfis,like
 
the transcendent non-sexuallove of which he tries to tell Phaedrus.
 
Butfor Nietzsche,none ofthis talk can be true because language,as
 
we will discuss later,is only metaphorical and can never be escaped
 
or transcended. There may be a truth to transcend to, but unlike
 
Socrates,Nietzsche does notthink that language is a way to arrive
 
there.
 
In Gorgias,Plato has Socrates debating several Sophists in an
 
attempt to illustrate whatrhetoric should not be. 1 believe the most
 
importantissue discussed in this dialogue,in relation to truth and
 
dissimulation as well as foundational and anti-foundational truth,is
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when Socrates tells Gorgias that a distinction must be drawn between
 
"knowledge and belief" or "the true and the probable."(Bizzell,
 
Herzberg 66) Persuasive rhetoric,according to Gorgias,really only
 
deals with belief or the probable; but,for Socrates rhetoric and
 
dialectic mustdeal with knowledge and certainty. Socrates
 
acknowledges"conventional truth" and "natural truth" in the affairs
 
of men such as Gorgias,but he belittles this "popular clap trap"in
 
favor oftranscendent truth(Bizzell,Herzberg 84). Socrates'ultimate
 
example ofhow this truth will be played out in our lives for thefew
 
remaining doubters at the end ofthe diaologue is the truth found in
 
judgement after death.
 
Buthow can any human know this transcendent truth? The
 
attempts at an answer have v^ed throughout the rhetorical
 
tradition,starting with Plato's attempts in thePhaedrus;but none
 
has broughtrhetoricians and philosophers closer to any tangible
 
understandings,and thatis where Nietzsche steps in. Dialectic and
 
rhetoric can never bring us closer to truth because wecan notescape
 
our own rhetoricity. Consequently issues ofethical and unethical
 
uses ofrhetoric continue to be conventional even if we choose to call
 
these conventions universals. Socrates in Gorgias tries to
 
demonstrate thatconventional and/or natural truths are not
 
universal or transcendent truths, buteven he can not definitively
 
illustrate and define how rhetoric can do this. We,as humans,can
 
notescape convention and nature,even if there is ajudgement
 
waiting for us at death,as Socrates points outto Gorgias. Yet
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Nietzsche as well as many modem epistemic rhetoricians feel that we
 
can become aware ofthese conventions that are influencing us. And
 
so now,I'll turn to Nietzsche's idea oftmth and how that affects the
 
ideas ofa knowledge creating rhetoric,an epistemic rhetoric.
 
Nietzsche'sAnti-Fomdational Thought
 
The transcendental and absolutist truth that Plato purports was
 
finally,after more than two thousand years,correctly countered by
 
Frederich Nietzsche. Nietzsche's 1873 essay"On Truth and Lies in a
 
Nonmoral Sense"confronts the initial Platonic issues and tensions of
 
rhetoric: truth/non-truth,language/reality,tropes/is-ness,
 
self/others, humaness/animalness,intuition/logic,power/knowledge,
 
subjectivity/objectivity,and ofcourse foundational truth versus
 
anti-foundational truth,hence epistemic rhetoric. Nietzsche responds
 
to the Platonic legacy in diametrical opposition,flatly stating that
 
there is no truth to transcend to through rhetoric. Nietzsche asserts
 
that all language is metaphorical and consequently is a lie because
 
language only represents and does notcontain the thing of which itis
 
speaking. Language can not be a medium for truth because language
 
in its metaphoricalness expresses nothing true or real;language only
 
represents the signs and symbols that we deceive ourselves with as
 
human beings. Therefore,language,as a human creation,can never
 
be transcended. It is a product ofour humanness,and we are a
 
product ofit.
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As Bizzell and Herzberg write in their introduction to
 
Nietzsche's"On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense:"
 
Language,Nietzsche continues,conveys nosensations but'
 
copies ofsensations,' not things butimages ofour perception of
 
things. Words are signs ofourimpulses and do no represent'a
 
many sided,respectable knowledgeofthings.' In short,
 
emphasizes Nietzsche,'language is rhetoric,because it desires
 
to convey only a doxa,notan episteme.(886)
 
This assertion finally responds to the dialectic started in the
 
Phaedrus,the dialectic on whatNietzsche and later Foucaultcall the
 
will to truth. Nietzsche thinks thatour search for truth is a way that
 
we as humans,both individually and societally,separate ourselves
 
fron the is-ness of nature. Nietzsche asserts that this is a stance of
 
dissimulation,a stance oflies about whatconstitutes our reality.
 
Classical rhetoricians thought oflanguage as anthropomorphic,and
 
consequently language is humankind's greatest societal construct.
 
Nietzsche concedes the same point,but his conclusion is different.
 
The difference between the Classic rhetoricians and Nietzsche is that
 
Nietzsche argues that we only flatter our human egos when we think
 
this anthropomorphic language construct could lead to truth(On
 
Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense 892). Language is figuration,
 
and consequently,"there is no unrhetorical'naturalness'oflanguage
 
to which one could appeal"(885). "The tropes are notjust
 
occasionally added to words but constitute their most proper nature"
 
(886).
 
Nietzsche writes,"The drive toward the formation of metaphors
 
is the fundamental human drive"(894). This statement makes it
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clear why humans since pre-Classic times have always enjoyed
 
mythology,storytelling,the reading offiction and poetry,as well as
 
lingusitics and semiotics. According to Nietzsche, metaphorical
 
language engages our very humaness,yeton a level that seems
 
pleasantly intuitive instead ofdisturbingly logical. Unlike the logical
 
positivists that preceeded Nietzsche,and who wanted to scientifically
 
control language in order to bring language to truthfulness,Nietzsche
 
rejoices in the metaphoricalness oflanguage and his writing style is
 
highly figurative and aphoristic. Having resigned himself to the
 
dissimulative trap that his language theory leaves humanity in,he
 
plays directly with that dissimulation.
 
According to Nietzsche,humans have an invincible inclination
 
to be deceived. Accordingly,even Plato deceives himselfand others
 
into believing that there must be an absolutisttranscendent truth.
 
Humans beings,from the Classical period to the present,define lies
 
as the conscious making ofa false or misleading statement. Butthe
 
lie that underlies this understanding oflies is that wechoose to
 
believe that language has the capacity to communicate honesty,
 
knowledge or truth. According to Nietzsche,language never
 
communicates universals,language only communicates social
 
conventions;and therefore all language and signs are dissimulation.
 
The master deception is the intellect, because the intellect can
 
deceive usinto believing anything,such as a questfor truth,a
 
dramatic play,or thatculturally-bound knowledge is universally
 
true,a trap in hindsight that is true ofthe Platonic dialogues and
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their relative truth to Greek soeiety. For instance,"Democracy" was
 
qualified for only non-slave men,a"Truth" we would think ofas
 
preposterous today.
 
Dissimulation from Nietzsche's point ofview is not seen in the
 
Classical light ofethical and unethical manipulation ofthe language,
 
as in the Platonic/Sophistic debate. Dissimulation to Nietzsche is
 
non-moral,or pre-moral,since dissimulation is the basis for
 
everything that allows humans to think ofthemselves as different
 
from nature. Human language is an anthropomorphic creation; and
 
so Nietzsche asserts that to think oflanguage and rhetoric as a
 
vehicle to truth,a human truth,is a lie before nature(889).
 
Consequently,Nietzsche concludes that all language is metaphor and
 
metaphors lie. Non-morallies are the human condition.
 
It is important to note that the title of Nietzsche's essay is
 
"Truth and Liesin a Nonmoral Sense." The"NonmoralSense"is the
 
distinction that was not made in discussing truth throughout the
 
rhetorical tradition,including the Platonic/Sophistic debatefrom
 
whatI have read. The rhetorical tradition has always looked at the
 
ethical and unethical uses oflanguage,as we will see later in the
 
chapter,but Nietzsche has redirected us back to the basic debate that
 
Socrates started on whether truth exists or not. Plato and Socrates,
 
transcending the issue ofthe ethical use oflanguage,say yes,truth
 
exists, Nietzsche,transcending the issue of the ethic|al use of
 
language,says no,truth can not exist. Both Plato and Socrates knew
 
that asking whether truth exists or not is not an ethical question,and
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so it is Plato and Nietzsche,both drawing different conclusions,that
 
define the parameters,the dialectic,ofthe rhetorical tradition,and
 
consequently ofepistemic rhetoric.
 
And so,if alllanguage is figurative dissimulation,then whatis
 
truth for Nietzsche? Completelyin opposition to Plato's ideal ofan
 
absolutist truth,Nietzsche's "truth" is a "rhetorical construction
 
arising from the creative use oflanguage for the purpose of making
 
an effective social arrangement"(886). To quote Nietzsche:
 
"Whatthen is truth? A movable hostof metaphors,
 
metonymies,and anthropomorphisms:in short,asum of
 
human relations which have poetically and rhetorically
 
intensified, transferred, and embellished,and which,after long
 
usage,seem to a people to be fixed,canonical,and binding.
 
Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions; they
 
are metaphors that become worn out and have been drained of
 
sensuousforce,coins which have lost their embossing and are
 
now considered as metal and nolonger as coins"(891)
 
Before we explore Nietzsche's ideas oftruth any further
 
though,it mustbe made clear that Nietzsche did notcome to the
 
socialconstructionist epistemology that is dominantin post-modem
 
thought. Nietzsche's radical opposition to Plato simply contrasts
 
Plato's absolute truth with Nietzsche's absolute untruth. In other
 
words,Nietzsche clarified the epistemic parameters with Plato's
 
absolute truth on one side and his absolute non-truth on the other.
 
As a non-absolutist truth,socially constructed tmth compromised
 
Nietzsche's epistemology. Only later would Foucault clarify Nietzsche
 
in light of the post-modernist epistemology. Thus Nietzsche
 
understood a social constmctionist epistemology. Despite seeing it as
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an inter-subjective truth for different discourse communities,
 
Nietzsche saw social constructionism as an acknowledgmentofthe
 
inherent dissimulation in language yet a continuance in the search
 
for truth just the same,(hence the will to truth and the will to power
 
enacted by different groups). Nietzsche's rhetorical ideas lead to the
 
post-modem construct ofdiscourse communities,in which meaning
 
depends on language,language depends on culture,and knowledge is
 
socially constructed within interpretive communities. "The"will to
 
trath" and "will to power",as both Nietzsche and Foucault call it,and
 
which I willfurther explore in chapter three,can only occur when
 
weforget that we are products oflanguage. That is to say,the will to
 
trath is self-flattery and self-deception. Truth consequently can only
 
be a"movable host of metaphors,metonymies,and
 
anthropomorphisms"(891). Wethink we attain epistemic power by
 
naming something,butin doing so we only reinforce our
 
dissimulative views oflanguage and the world. Socrates and Plato,
 
according to my interpretation of Nietzsche,lead us on a false
 
rhetorical search. Even if there is a truth to transcend to,as Socrates
 
proposes in the Fhaedrus,it could never be arrived at through any
 
construct oflanguage such as rhetoric,dialectic,or the search for
 
definitions. Our only reality, our only truth,is our own
 
metaphoricalness.
 
In Other words,the continual debatefrom the Classical period
 
to the present has misinterpreted Plato's basic premise about truth's
 
relationship to language. It was only Nietzsche who saw through this
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confusion to the basic issue that Socrates and Plato,as deceivers to
 
good,must haveknown,butkept a secret because it had no didactic
 
purpose. AsL F.Stone asserts,Socrates believed that truth
 
transcends language,and he spent his whole life trying to define
 
truth without success(93). Why could Socrates neverdefine truth?
 
Nietzsche's answer would be that no one,noteven Socrates,could
 
transcend language. This distinction is one that presupposes any
 
dialectic on the ethical and unethical uses ofrhetoric,and
 
consequently it clears the philosophical playing field so that modem
 
and post-modem philosophers and rhetoricians can see the
 
boundaries beyond the limits ofdidactic debate.
 
Nietzsche's Thoughtas a Social Construction
 
J. Hillis Miller analyzes how Nietzsche came to his
 
epistemological conclusions and how Nietzsche's assertions relate to
 
contemporary ideas ofsocial constractionism. Millerreads
 
Nietzsche's idea oftmth and its relationship to language like this:
 
"No proper language exists. The'proper'is already'improper.'
 
Tmth is therefore grounded in access through the senses to the
 
essence ofthe thing. Tmth is rather a conventionally agreed
 
upon set oflies. Tmth is lie notin the sense that it can be
 
measured as false againstsome attainable correct naming.
 
Tmth is lie in the sense thatit claims a false grounding in
 
things as they are, wherein fact it's constitutive,not
 
constative"(318).
 
In his article entitled "Nietzsche in Basel: Writing and Reading,"
 
Miller points out that,although Nietzsche was not lead to social
 
constmctionism as a way to look at tmth,he did come to his ideas
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aboutthe lie of truth in a mostsocial constructionistfashion. In
 
studying Nietzsche's notesfrom this time period, Miller points out
 
that Nietzsche wasreading and teaching the Classics in Basel when
 
the interaction of his own reading and writings. Classical readings
 
and modem writings,along with his interaction with the students,
 
led him to his theory ofdissimulation. Nietzsche's theory,that Miller
 
condenses above,came,in hindsight,as an act of social constmction.
 
Nietzschefound his anti-foundational views within the dialectic in
 
trying to teach the foundational views ofPlato to his students in
 
Basel. In other words,the interpretive community,made up of his
 
class in Basel,allowed Nietzsche to see thatfoundational Classical
 
rhetoric lacked a countering dialectic; Nietzsche thus constructed his
 
dissumulative anti-foundational theory. (One wonders what Socrates
 
would have thoughtif Nietzsche had been his student and not
 
Phaedms.)
 
Miller demonstrates that Nietzsche,atthe writing of"Tmth and
 
Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,"saw that there was no truth,or even
 
literal language,to transcend to. "Rhetoric as persuasion and rhetoric
 
as tropes are the same,since all language is tropological and the
 
tropes persuade. Alllanguage is persuasive rather than tmth telling.
 
Alllanguage is primordially rhetorical"(Miller 321). This leads to
 
the inclusionary/exclusionary problems within epistemic rhetoric
 
thatI will explore in chapter three. If all language is rhetorical,or
 
naturally persuasive,then positions must be sought and taught in an
 
anti-foundational rhetoric. This has given rise to discourse
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communities asa way to understand the necessarily relative or
 
inter-subjective truth.
 
Post-Nietzschean Epistemic Rhetoric
 
So where does epistemic rhetoric now stand? According to
 
Nietzsche,language is rhetoric because it conveys only doxa,not
 
episteme. This doxa or opinion,which in our blindness stand for
 
truth,is created notdiscovered,and then is only relative to each
 
"herd"(889).(Nietzsche uses "herd" to describe pejoratively what we
 
think oftoday as discourse communities). Words are signs and these
 
signs do not,and can not,represent,"a many sided and respectable
 
knowledge ofthings,"(886)because language or rhetoric conveys
 
only opinion and notknowledge. Epistemic rhetoric,from this
 
extreme Nietzschean view,is figuration that only creates opinion,not
 
knowledge. Consequently the idea of socially constructed knowledge,
 
the dominant epistemic rhetoric today,would be part of the middle
 
ground between Nietzsche's created "lies" and Plato's discovered
 
"truths."
 
This will to truth within the legacy ofepistemic rhetoric also
 
creates will to power,asevidenced in Berlin's ideological definitions
 
ofepistemic rhetoric. Personal and social power are expressed in all
 
levels oflanguage. Language is persuasive and rhetoric expresses
 
the will to power. Socrates and Plato express their will to power by
 
trying to elevate the student through the transforming power of
 
dialectic and the search for definitions. The will to power is being
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expressed here in the didactic Platonic belief that rhetoric should be
 
used to persuade for the good. Butifrhetoric can be used to
 
persuade for the good,so too can it be used to persuade for the bad.
 
This is why will to power is usually thought ofas the unethical and
 
dissimulative part ofrhetoric, butfor Nietzsche will to power is
 
beyond good and evil(Kaufman 179). Itis beyond good and evil
 
because rhetoric can never escape its own rhetoricalness,its own
 
dissimulation. As the Nietzschean scholar Howard Kaufman asserts,
 
the will to poweris part ofevery language act whether the speaker
 
believes that his or her language is being used ethically or
 
unethically(11-12). This will to power,emphasized in the work of
 
Foucault,whofollows in Nietzsche's footsteps,underlies the
 
inclusionary/exclusionary tension in discourse communities that
 
epistemic rhetoric sees the world through. We will discuss this
 
furtherin the third and last chapter.
 
TheLegacy ofEpistemic Thoughtfrom Plato to Nietzsche
 
Besides Foucault,many philosophers and rhetoricians have
 
looked at the epistemologicalchange that has occurred in Westem
 
thought since Classical times. Berlin writes,"Rhetoric is epistemic
 
because knowledge itself is a rhetorical construct. Having historical
 
precedents in Vico,Marx,and a brilliant modem articulation in
 
Kenneth Burke,this stance argues that epistemology is rhetorical,is
 
itselfa social and historical construct"(Rhetoric and Reality 165).
 
Knoblauch and Brannon point to the Scientific Revolution as the
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beginning pointfor the change in the episteme(4-5). Numerous
 
books have been written about the epistemological influences that
 
have created our modern ideas ofepistemic rhetoric. How and why
 
did this episteme change? From my pointofview,the changesin
 
epistemic rhetoric have come about as a result of historical social
 
change,ofepistemic change. Nietzsche'sidea ofdissimulation
 
brought social change and,according to Miller, was an act of social
 
construction.
 
If Nietzsche's thought was both an actofsocialconstruction,as
 
Miller claims,as well as dependenton the legacy ofrhetorical
 
thought that proceeded him,who were some ofthe great thinkers
 
within that rhetoricallegacy that led to the eventual paradigm shift
 
in the episteme?
 
Grateful to Bizzell and Herzberg's The Rhetorical Tradition.,1
 
have surveyed this legacy,and although 1 don't think it would be
 
productive to detaileach ofthese rhetorical scholar's influence,1
 
would like to answer the above question with some ofthe names
 
that make up this legacy and whoseinfluence we are a product of.
 
In Classical times the dialectic was widened beyond Platonic
 
thought by the Sophists,Isocrates,Aristotle, Cicero,and Quintilian.
 
Augustine saw the end ofthis age by arguing for truth over
 
eloquence, but then Europefound itselfin an anti-rhetorical period,
 
the Dark Ages or the age offaith.
 
During the Renaissance,reason,free will, the imagination,and
 
language as a sign and symbol system becamep^ofrhetorical
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discourse once more through Erasmus and Bacon, This wasfollowed
 
by many great thinkers in the Scientific Revolution and the
 
Englightenmentincluding Locke and Yico, And the discourse from
 
the Renaissance to the Enlightenment was not only confined to the
 
work of male scholars,since earlierfeministrhetoricians like De
 
Pisan,Cereta,Fell,and Grimke also add to the widening rhetorical
 
discourse.
 
Bender and Wellbery,in their bookTAeEndsofRhetoric,write
 
that,"To understand the significance ofrhetoric today is to
 
understand why and in what ways it is discontinuous with its past"
 
(4). Now that we have familiarized ourselves with both the
 
discontinuity and the parameters ofepistemic rhetoric created by
 
Plato and Nietzsche,as well as scanning the legacy thatcame
 
between them,wecan move to chapter three where we will examine
 
the influence ofepistemic rhetoric on contemporary composition
 
studies and in particular the inclusionary/exclusionary tension thatit
 
has inherited.
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CHAPTER THREE
 
THEINFLUENCEOFEPISTEMIC RHETORIC
 
ONCONTEMPORARYCOMPOSITION STUDIES
 
AsI demonstrated in the last chapter,Nietzsche,as Foucault
 
and others recognize,is the dividing line in rhetorical thought. "The
 
episteme has changed"(The Order ofThings xxii). For over two
 
thousand years rhetoricians reacted to the Platonic idea of
 
transcendent absolutist truth. The shift awayfrom the Platonic
 
legacy began in the seventeenth century with the Scientific
 
Revolution(Knoblauch,Brannon 51). Yetit was not until Nietzsche,
 
in the nineteenth century,thata definitive counterpoint argument
 
was offered to define the dialectical borders ofrhetoric,Platonic
 
absolutist truth on the foundational or logocentric side,and
 
Nietzschean dissimulation on the anti-foundational side.
 
Consequently,in the last one hundred years,the rhetorical debate on
 
whatconstitutes truth has been wide open as the parameters of
 
foundational and anti-foundational thought havecome to be
 
understood. Coming out of that ongoing debate,socially constructed
 
discourse communities have arisen as the dominant vehicle through
 
which contemporary epistemic rhetoric is understood. In this
 
chapter I will discuss,expanding from the definitions offered in
 
chapter one,the influences ofsocially-constructed discourse
 
communities on epistemic rhetoric and how their
 
inclusionary/exclusionary dialectic reflects the contemporary
 
dialectic in the foundational/anti-foundational episteme. The thesis
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thatI will arrive atin this chapter is that the foundational and
 
exclusionary tensions limitcomposition studies pedagogically and
 
epistemologically,whereas the anti-foundational and inclusionary
 
tensions enable composition studies to more effectively teach writing
 
and thought.
 
Before I discuss whata discourse community is exactly,and
 
how recognition ofdiscourse communities has opened up the far-

reaching issue ofinclusion and exclusion in language,and in
 
particular composition studies,I need to return to Foucault. In the
 
last chapter I discussed Foucault's archaeological recognition ofthe
 
changing episteme in Western culture. I also touched on how
 
Foucault has expanded on Nietzsche's concepts of will to power and
 
will to truth. Before Ican discuss the dialectical tensions in
 
contemporary discoursecommunity theory,I need to further clarify
 
the episteme as a reflection of discourse. Discourse then can be
 
understood in its relationship to the will to power and will to truth,
 
two concepts that underlie the discussion in the rest of this chapter
 
on the influences ofepistemic rhetoric in contemporary composition
 
studies.
 
Foucault
 
In The OrderofThings,Foucault writes that he has concerned
 
himself"with a history ofresemblance: on whatconditions was
 
Classical thought able to reflect relations ofsimilarity or equivalence
 
with things"(30). Discourse in Classical times was not a "thing,"
 
59
 
because discourse was decoration to express pre-existing thought;
 
butFoucault's work tries to show that discourse is the most
 
important"thing" becausein this thing oflanguage,or discourse,is
 
displayed both will to power and will to truth. Discourse is not
 
dressing up ofideas,and rhetoric is notsimply about ethical and
 
unethical eloquence,as in Platonic thought. Discourse is_thought.
 
Thoughtisa thing. And this thing displays who we are and aren't,
 
both individually and societally.
 
Seeing discourse as a real entity,as thought itself, has changed
 
modem epistemology. Foucaultlooks at this changing epistemology
 
from many sides,and sees that the foundational underpinnings of
 
Classical thoughtcould no longer answer the questions in a changing
 
Western culture. "Sixteenth-century knowledge condemned itself to
 
neverknowing anything but the samething,and moreover to know
 
that thing only atthe unattainable end ofan endlessjourney"(30).
 
Foucaultfurther characterizes the Classicallegacy that dominated up
 
until the seventeenth century,by exposing "first and foremost,the
 
plethoric yet absolutely poverty stricken character of this
 
knowledge"(30). Foundationalism had led the Classical episteme
 
into a syllogistic circle of non-generativity.
 
During the Scientific Revolution,language as a sign system
 
cameinto being,and consequently began to recapture its generative
 
nature as discourse. Discourse,Foucault asserts, became a real thing.
 
"In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the peculiar existence
 
and ancient solidity oflanguage as a thing inscribed in the fabric of
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the world were dissolved in thefunctioning ofrepresentation; all
 
language had value only as discourse"(43). Foucaultcalls this
 
gradual awakeningfrom the Classical legacy,"the an±ropological
 
sleep" (340-341). Kuhn would describe it a paradigm shift. The
 
anthropological sleep was not understood as being over until
 
Nietzsche connected,in his various works,"the philosophical task
 
with aradicalreflection on language"(305). Exposing this
 
anthropological sleep gave rise to an understanding about will to
 
power and will to truth that is ever presentin discourse.
 
Bizzell and Herzberg write that,"In The Order ofThings
 
Foucaultremarks that the tendency of Western Philosophy,since the
 
demise ofthe Sophists,has been to deny discourse its own reality
 
and to think ofdiscourse as the dress ofthought or the conveyor of
 
pre-existing meaning. Foucault calls this tendency the'will to truth'"
 
(1126). The "will to power" goes hand in hand with the will to truth.
 
The will to power,according to Nietzsche,is a basic human drive that
 
comes outin gross displays ofpower,subjugations ofindividuals and
 
groups,as well as in subtler circumstances like the artists trying to
 
give order to an otherwise chaotic scene. Language is the dominant
 
medium for the will to power and the will to truth(886-887).
 
AsI demonstrated in chapter two,wesaw that Nietzsche
 
deconstructed Plato's truth as both the will to truth and the will to
 
power. Plato's idea ofrhetoric,that of didactic persuasion for the
 
good ofthe listener,is the will to power and truth exercised and
 
exhibited. Since Nietzsche's insight, will to truth and will to power
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can be seen as existing in discourse,because discourse is a real thing
 
that never escapes the basic human drives to display both a will to
 
truth and a will to power. Found universally in language,these two
 
forces underpin the inclusionary/exclusionary dialectic thatI will be
 
exploring in contemporary uses and understandings ofdiscourse
 
communitiesin composition studies. Understanding the will to truth
 
means asking, who's truth and for whatend? Understanding the will
 
to power means asking,who's power and for whatend?
 
Foucault asserts thatlooking atlanguage,discourse,and
 
discourse communities will answer those two questions about truth
 
and power. Richard Rorty,in examining the epistemological change
 
that Foucault has brought about, writes that Foucault "insists that he
 
wants to question our will to truth,to restore to discourse its
 
character as an event,and to abolish the sovereignty ofthe signifier"
 
(43). An awareness ofdiscourse communitiesin composition studies
 
is continuing Foucault's agenda in that discourse can now be analyzed
 
as the vehicle ofknowledge. Examining the various discourse
 
communities(the signifiers and their sovereignty)is examining their
 
truth and power claims.
 
Ofcourse underlying these issues ofpower,truth,and
 
discourse is the conceptofhegemony,supremacy exercised and
 
exhibited. Barry Smartin"The Politics ofTruth and the Problem of
 
Hegemony"reads Foucault's work on these themes of will to power
 
and will to truth as the basis for understanding hegemony,a
 
continually contentious issue that underlies discourse communities.
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Smart asserts that political analysiscan bestrengthened by using the
 
concepts of will to truth and will to powerin conjunction with
 
linguistic discourse-analysis as a way to deepen our understanding of
 
the hegemony that is exercised in the language ofany discourse
 
community,i
 
AsI demonstrated in chaptertwo,the ethical/unethical debate
 
that pervaded Classical rhetoric has now been replaced by the
 
foundational/anti-foundational debate. This contemporary debate
 
reflects the study and understanding,through discourse,of who has
 
power,who claims truth,and how people use their language to keep
 
or share that power and truth. Knowing that truth claims,power
 
claims,and discourse as the source ofthese claims, underlie any
 
understanding ofdiscourse communities and socially constructed
 
thought,Inow can discuss contemporary understandings of ties in
 
composition studies on a less lofty level. Ican analyze how discourse
 
1 These words hegemony,power,truth,and discourse can all be seen
 
negatively within their binary nature. I don't wantto succumb to the
 
negative interpretation in this chapter. I wantto recognize it, butI want
 
liberate it and focus moreon the productive and progressiveside,as Smart and
 
others do in their work. Humans may be stuck in language,butknowing that
 
humankind is stuck in language allows hiunans a sense ofempowerment.
 
Certainly mostofthe work in feminist criticism would assert that. And from
 
both"Whatis an Author" mdTheHistory ofSexuality: The Will To Know,
 
Foucault makes clearthat discourse itselfis a signifier'discourse is productive
 
and inclusionary,and notjust exclusionary. I think it's easy to become
 
disenchanted with a post-modernist interpretation ofFoucault. Richard Rorty
 
writes,Foucault's Nietzschean attititude towards theidea ofepistemology is that
 
these is nothing optimisdc to say"(46). This may be true forsome,but I'd
 
rather not deal with that darker,and possibly even nihilistic,side ofdiscourse
 
communities as they relate to composition studies. I see xmderstanding
 
discourse communities,and language as a signifier as Foucault would say,as
 
part ofthe knowledge making and liberating influence in the modem
 
interpretation ofepistemic rhetoric.
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communities both limit and enable epistemic rhetoric.
 
"Discourse"andDiscourse Communities
 
The epistemoiogical basis of understanding in contemporary
 
epistemic rhetoric is the discourse community. Each ofthese words,
 
discourse and community,have differentconnations by themselves.
 
By first examining the understanding ofdiscourse,and then examing
 
the understanding ofcommunity,we can understand how epistemic
 
rhetoric uses them together.
 
In defining discourse communities Frank J. Angelo points out
 
thatthe word discourse,as it's used in composition studies to denote
 
the aims,modes,and forms of written and spoken language,should
 
be separated from the discourse ofdiscourse communities(131).
 
Discourse,by itself,carries a meaning in the Classical tradition as the
 
clothing ofthoughtinstead ofthoughtitself. I use discourse in the
 
post-modern sense in which language and thought are inseparable.
 
Teaching post-modem discourse in the contemporary epistemic
 
rhetoric classroom is more than teaching awareness of simple
 
textual features ofa particular writing genre,i.e. the clothing of
 
thought. Teaching post-modem discourse is demonstrating a way of
 
thinking and knowing as seen from a particular point of view,i.e.
 
situated thought. A classicist,say in the footsteps of Aristotle or
 
Cicero,would be interested in codifying and taxonomizing a
 
particular genre or discourse. A contemporary epistemic
 
rhetorician's interest would go beyond that to seeing discourse as a
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way ofknowing. Knoblauch and Brannon,in comparing Classical and
 
contemporary notions ofdiscourse,make the distinction that
 
contemporary ideas ofdiscourse hold thatknowledge is not static
 
(87). Discourse should be seen as an active knowledge maker or
 
discoverer,depending on one's epistemological stance. Discourse
 
represents more than conventions;it represents epistemology,an
 
epistemology that reflects the knowledge ofa particular community.
 
If,as Knoblauch and Brannon write,"Modem rhetorical theory,
 
beginning as early as the seventeenth century,finds a closer
 
connection between language and thought,discourse and knowledge,
 
than ancient speculation supposed"(4),then in teaching we are using
 
an awareness ofdiscourse communities to teach thinking as a process
 
through the medium oflanguage. "Discourse,then,farfrom having
 
the restrictive presentationalfunction thatthe ancientrhetoricians
 
supposed,actually has a central and generative role in the pursuit of
 
knowledge"(53). Exploring,sharing,and expanding language,that is
 
discourse,creates knowledge,and knowledge becomes the basis for a
 
community of understanding.
 
"Community"andDiscourse Communities
 
Having clarified the nature ofcontemporary discourse,let's
 
now examine how the word discourse relates to the word
 
community.
 
The word community in discourse community is widely used.
 
As Joseph Harris writes,the word community "seems never to be
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used unfavorably"(12). Marilyn Cooper,who has used feminist
 
criticism to look at both the enabling and limiting aspects of
 
discourse communities,defines discoursecommunity asfollows:
 
A discourse community is characterzized by certain underlying
 
assumptions,knowledge,values,and interests its members
 
hold in common and by the use ofcertain language conventions
 
- - types ofargument,genres,and vocabulary. Academic
 
disciplines seems to be the prototypical discourse communities,
 
but professions,corporations,and hobby groups also seem to
 
qualify.(204)
 
Forinstance,the composition studies'discourse community
 
broadly integrates literature,linguistics,and rhetoric;and within
 
these disciplines the practitioners have been labeled within the
 
various communities ofexpressionism,cognitive psychology,social
 
constructionism or social epistemic rhetoric. In other words,defining
 
the boundaries ofany discourse community is a continually evolving
 
process,particularly because the language that creates knowledgein
 
each discourse community never remains entirely static. And so
 
discourse,in relation to discourse community,can be defined as
 
representing the socially constructed epistemological base ofany
 
group oflanguage users.
 
Thomas Kent,a sceptic over the wide acceptance ofdiscourse
 
communites as a way to understand contemporary academic studies,
 
describes our current understanding ofdiscourse communities as
 
either thick or thin.
 
The thick formulation understands acommunity to be asystem
 
of social conventions that may be isolated and codified. The
 
thin formulation understands community to be a chorus of
 
polyphonous voices. We understand a spectrum of different
 
uses ofthe term community;on one end ofthe spectrum are
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thick formulations that depict acommunity as a determinate
 
and codifiable entity,and on the other end are thin
 
formulations that depicta community as relatively
 
indeterminate and uncodifiable sedimentation ofdesires and
 
beliefs.(425)
 
Besides codification,identification by the self and otherscan be
 
another important way to understand the parameters ofany given
 
discourse community. Erika Lindeman has drawn in this important
 
concept ofidentification by examing Kenneth Burke's work on
 
symbols. Lindemann writes that,according to Burke,human beings
 
are "linguistic animals,using and misusing symbols. Rhetoric is a
 
function oflanguage which enables human beings to overcome the
 
divisions separating them"(49). Lindemann defines the difference
 
between the "old" rhetoric,or Classical rhetoric,and the"new"
 
rhetoric as a difference between persuasion and identification,
 
persuasion within the Classical ethical/unethical debate and
 
identification within the foundational/anti-foundational discourse
 
community debate. "Identification is a key conceptin Burke's theory
 
ofrhetoric; it explains why human beings actrhetorically on one
 
another - to promote social cohesion"(49). Discourse communities
 
are consequently ways ofrelating to others, ways ofidentification.
 
The language used in a discourse community provides the cohesive
 
force that provides an identity for its members.
 
Butidentification,codification,and persuasion, within discourse
 
communities,as Kent,Lindeman,and Burke point out,relies most
 
importantly on each discourse community's epistemological role.
 
Identification and persuasion have to do with how community
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membersinvestin the group's epistemology. Identification works
 
like persuasion in including or excludihg would be members.
 
Codification has to do with how much power the members have to
 
influence the group's epistemology.Ifa group can epistemologicaliy
 
persuade new members tojoin within the self-identified and codified
 
epistemological parameters,then that discourse community is a
 
"thick" and vibrant discourse community.
 
Discourse communities as seen from acontemporary
 
perspective,as Lindman's and Kent's scholarship show,are part of"a
 
long-time intellectual development,no passing fad ofthe twentieth
 
century,buta serious reorganization ofdiscourse theory that has
 
permanently altered the way contemporary rhetoricians view
 
composition"(Knoblauch,Brannon 57).
 
According to Foucault,discourse communities are simply a way
 
to understand a group's regulated ways ofspeaking,and this is an
 
important diagnostic tool in analyzing the rhetoric ofthe various
 
discourse communities. Foucault also asserts that the birth of
 
foundationalism occured when regulated ways ofspeech were no
 
longer thought ofas social fabrications, but as the reality ofany
 
particular group or society. Foundationalism began,according to
 
Foucault,in the fifth century B.C.of Classical Greece as a fallacy
 
within the will to truth(Cooper206). Socrates,as a person who
 
intimately knew thatlanguage could persuade for both the good and
 
bad,could well have been aware of this fallacy when he was defied
 
in his search for archetypal or foundational definitions. As we saw in
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chapter two,seeing through this fallacy and recognizing anti-

foundational thought is the way that Nietzsche responded to teaching
 
Socratic thought.
 
Marilyn Cooper asserts that discourse at its root is anti-

foundational because ofits specificity to each time,place,and
 
community. "The reality ofdiscourse is characterized by its
 
discontinuity, which is to say that it is not grounded in any'original,'
 
'true'language" or discourse(207). Discourse is neither external nor
 
internal, objective nor subjective. It's intersubjective,or as I quoted
 
Berlin in chapter one of this thesis,discourse is transactional.
 
I can go no further in discussing discourse communities as the
 
dominant vehicle for contemporary epistemic rhetoric without
 
briefly introducing the influence ofStanley Fish,since,as Gary Olson
 
in ih& JournalofAdvanced Composition claims,Stanley Fish has
 
been one"ofthe principal intellectual sources ofsocial
 
constructionism"(Olson 253). Stanley Fish has been called "The
 
Contemporary Sophist" because "he sees an affinity between Sophism
 
and the anti-foundational project he has solong championed"(253).
 
Fish is aware of,and a part of,the rhetorical legacy and dialectic. He
 
"has always insisted that rhetoric is central,that it's the'necesssary
 
center,' that substantial realities are products ofrhetorical,
 
persuasive, political efforts"(253).
 
Although Fish has not been busy building theoretical
 
paradigms like Berlin or Fulkerson,he has contributed greatly to the
 
theory building in contemporary composition studies. Fish argues
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that interpreting discourse communtiesin composition studies,just
 
like interpreting fiction in literary studies,is becoming a necessary
 
skill, but that the history and influence ofdiscourse analysis and/or
 
rhetorical analysis has up until now been only minimal. In Fish's
 
hookDoing WhatComesNaturally,Fish addressessome ofthese
 
issues,and theory makers influenced by his work contend that
 
composition studies has along way to go.Part ofthe problem in
 
discourse analysis as well as for epistemic rhetoric,is that,as Jim W.
 
Corder asserts in CollegeEnglish,there are innumerable numbers of
 
discourse communities which are in constantflux(168). Rhetoric,
 
whether old or new,has not yet developed the tools to deal with all
 
these fluctuations,and so the work ofFish in deepening our
 
understanding ofanti-foundational thought as well as rhetorical
 
analysis is invaluable to epistemic rhetoric.
 
Discourse Communitiesand EpistemicRhetoric in the Classroom
 
So,ifdiscourse communities are knowledge creating
 
communities,then how do they limit and enable epistemic rhetoric,
 
and composition studies, both pedgagogically and epistemologically?
 
The epistemological awareness and analysis ofdiscourse
 
communities has caused composition studies to radically change its
 
pedagogy. AsI began to show in chapter one,epistemic rhetoric,as a
 
composition theory,hasresponded to these changes. Realizing that
 
academic discourse communities exist, progressive teachers have
 
researched and reflected on the ways they could make students both
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aware ofthe existence ofdiscourse communities and knowledgeable
 
enough to make a successful entry into these,primarily academic,
 
discourse communities.
 
Discourse community analysis in writing classes has become a
 
very important tool ofempowermentfor university classrooms. For
 
moststudents, particularly with an epistemic rhetorician for an
 
instructor,freshman English has become an initiation into the surface
 
levels ofthe academic discourse community. Patricia Bizzell writes,
 
"Writing teachers,then,have seen the lack ofshared discourse as a
 
problem and have to remedy the problem by studying ways to
 
initiate all students into academic discourse"(Beyond Anti-

Foundationalism 661). Teaching students, whocomefrom various
 
discourse communities,that the university represents a singular
 
academic discourse community is a starting place. It alsocan be
 
naive,since "academic discourse is more unstable that this - more
 
fraught with contradiction,more polyvocal~ and this instability is a
 
sign of health,its ability to adapt to changing historical conditions"
 
(663). In other words,within the larger discourse ofthe university,
 
there are many different academic discourse communities,each with
 
its own level ofdiversity and vibrancy. But withoutdaunting
 
students,thinking of university as the academic discourse
 
community has been an empowering starting pointfor epistemic
 
teachers. An entry point has tofound somewhere. The issues of
 
polyvocality and exclusion will become evident and can be dealt with
 
after the students have been included into at least the first layer of
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university discourse. Epistemic teachers need to dialogue with
 
students so that their students can find an entry point. The
 
hegemonic will to power and will to truth in the university is quite
 
intimidating to the averagefreshman,butifepistemic rhetoric is a
 
knowledge discovering or creating rhetoric,then the epistemic
 
classroom will provide the heuristics and critical language base for
 
entry into the discourse communities ofchoice.
 
Pedagogicalchanges that address discourse communities have
 
included basic writing programs to facilitate entry into the academic
 
discourse community,the use of peer tutoring and writing centers to
 
continue to deepen thatentry,and writing across the curriculum
 
programs in order to give ±e writing studentsome specialized
 
knowledge in his or her chosen academic discourse community.
 
Before welook atthese structural changes in writing programs that
 
havecome about out ofan awareness ofdiscourse communities,we
 
need to look at the role that collaborative leaming has had on
 
epistemic rhetoric.
 
Collaborative leaming,also sometimesknow as cooperative
 
learning,has been one ofthe main pedagogies to both deal with the
 
problem ofentrance into the academic discourse community and to
 
deepen an understanding of that discourse once entry has been
 
attained. Kenneth Bruffee,along with others in the exploratory
 
group that welooked at in chapter one^ has championed collaborative
 
leaming in several articles. These articles align themselves with his
 
research on social constructionism and consequently on how
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collaborative learning has become an important pedagogical tool of
 
epistemic rhetoric. Starting with the supposition that"We can think
 
because we can talk,and wethink in ways we have learned to talk"
 
(Conversation 641),Bruffee takes Stanley Fish's idea ofinterpretive,
 
or discourse,communities and integrates them with Richard Rorty's
 
concept ofnormal and abnormal discourse. Normal discourse
 
"applies to conversation within a community ofknowledgeable
 
peers,"(642)and "mastery ofa knowledge community's normal
 
discourse is the basic qualification for acceptance into that
 
community"(643). Consequently,Bruffee feels that the educational
 
implications for a social constructionistrhetoric,or an epistemic
 
rhetoric,are,"Conversation,Collaborative Learning,and'Normal
 
Discourse'"(641). Once these are mastered,then studentscan be
 
aware ofand take in,"Knowledge generating discourse," or abnormal
 
discourse(647).
 
Rorty's normal discourse is that which is conducted within an
 
agreed-upon set ofconventions about whatcounts as a relevant
 
contribution,whatcounts as answering a question, what counts as
 
having a good argument or a good criticism of it. Abnormal
 
discourse,on the other hand,is what happens when someonejoins in
 
the discourse who is ignorant ofthese conventions or who sets them
 
aside. Abnormaldiscourse can produce both nonsense and
 
intellectual revolution. Bruffee,in his article with the revealing title,
 
"Writing and Reading as Collaborative Social Acts," sees abnormal
 
discourse in well-facilitated collaborative learning as both a way to
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find entrance into a discourse community and as a way to create
 
knowledge within that discourse community. In addition,Stanley
 
Fish contends that an epistemic pedagogy would include
 
collaborative work in situatedness,code switching,and using
 
differentlanguage registers(Olson 259). Fish,like Bruffee,also
 
appreciates that"abnormaldiscourse can be a catalyst ofchange," an
 
important pedagogical tool(260). Collaborative learning provides the
 
pedagogical environmentfor students to access this transforming
 
knowledge.
 
Writing across the curriculum is also an important pedagogy
 
that deals with discourse communities. David R.Russell,who has
 
researched the history and legacy of writing across the curriculum
 
programs in composition studies, writes "Ideally cross-curricular
 
writing instruction would initiate students into the discourse ofa
 
professional community and give them extensive experience in
 
negotiating the discourse of other communities,other disciplines"
 
(Russell69). He also asserts that writing across the curriculum
 
programs confront the epistemologicalissue of discourse on an
 
institutional level. Russell complains that withoutthese programs,
 
most writing teachers are co-opted into the university's "myth of
 
transcience"(66). The myth of transcience means that basic writing
 
programs,writing across the curriculum programs,and writing
 
classes that emphasize entrance into the academic discourse
 
communities are seen as only a temporary part ofthe university's
 
mission,and not the primary part. In other words,when the student
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body gets"up to the appropriate university level," then these
 
remediating programs can be scrapped. The myth oftranscience
 
does notrecognize that the university's contemporary mission is to
 
open itself to the wider reality of ail the various discourse
 
communities. Writing across the curriculum programs,particularly
 
epistemic ones,fight against the myth oftranscience as well as the
 
university's privileged hegemony and exclusionary discourse.
 
Episteiruc writing across the curriculum programs enable students to
 
acquire the normal discourse and eventually add to the abnormal
 
knowledge-generating discourse. Discourse community entrance,
 
acceptance,and knowledge generation for the contemporary student
 
is the core ofthe university's mission(that is from an epistemic
 
rhetorician's point of view)whether this epistemological and
 
pedagogicalmission is acknowledged or not by the university power
 
structure.
 
Inclusion,Exclusion,and Discourse Communities
 
The tension of whether to include or exclude students as a
 
university mission brings me back to the all-important and
 
underlying theme in this chapter,and for that matter this whole
 
thesis. Discourse,contemporarily debated from foundational and
 
anti-foundational views,is bound up in a continuing
 
inclusionary/exclusionary dialectic. Having explained discourse,
 
discourse communities,and some ofthe pertinent epistemological
 
and pedagogical issues,I'll now look at the foundational and anti­
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foundational tensions and how they exclude and include writers and
 
thinkersfrom and into discourse communities. From there I'll be
 
able to discuss how this tension both enables and limits the legacy of
 
epistemic rhetoric as acomposition practice.
 
Discourse communitiescan be defined as groups of"people who
 
are more or less equals and agree upon values(Clark 68). Clark,
 
author of"Rescuing the Discourse Community," asserts that there is a
 
problem in this sort ofdefinition or any definition ofdiscourse
 
communities,"founded primarily upon shared commitment to
 
common principles or even to common projects"(65). Composition
 
studies likes to think ofdiscourse communities as a way of
 
understanding the power ofdemocracy and as a way to enter into its
 
power. But according to Marilyn Cooper,teachers that insist that
 
students confine themselves to the value,language,and genres ofthe
 
academic discourse community "will effectively withhold power
 
within academic discourse from students whocomefrom a different
 
generation,a different ethnic background,a different race,a
 
different sex,a different economic class" than the hegemonic
 
majority of the university(Cooper 219). These teachers will present
 
their view ofacademic discourse as a discourse that is foundational
 
with noroom for knowledge-generating abnormal discourse or
 
possibly even for entry by their students. On the other hand,if we
 
invite students to understand and participate,as epistemic rhetoric
 
and its transactional epistemology advocate,then we will include
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students with our anti-foundational, butcommunity-regulated,view
 
ofdiscourse.2
 
Some scholars,like Joseph Harris who has researched
 
collaborative pedagogies,are concerned aboutconstruing the words
 
"consensus"and"community," particularly because consensus is the
 
avowed aim of manyin collaborative learning groups. Harris
 
contends that communitiesseldom reach consensus. The word
 
community may describe the social and linguistic fabric that a group
 
may share,but it does not denote complete epistemological
 
agreement within this group. However,Harris concedes that,"Our
 
aims and intentionsin writing are thus not merely personal,
 
idiosyncratic,butreflective ofthe communities to which we belong"
 
(TheIdea ofCommunity 12). Thatis, writing and speaking are social,
 
and consequently anti-foundational acts. Instead ofdepending on
 
consensus as a way to describe any discourse community or
 
collaborative group,Harris suggests the use of words like "discourse,
 
language,voice,ideology,hegemony,"to describe the contentious
 
language and contradictions in any academic grouping(20). Harris
 
asserts that the word community should only be used to denote the
 
physical entity,including the people we directly associate with on a
 
daily basis.
 
2Pedagogically,yet notepistemologically,this could even be true ofthe
 
epistemic, yetfoundational,legacy going back to Socrates. Socrates used dialectic,an
 
inclusive pedagogy,to discover knowledge^ thus enabling the student to acquire
 
knowledge,but limiting the scope ofthat knowledge.
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Greg Meyers,who has written on collaborative learning,also
 
falls into this skeptical group. Meyers writes"we should notlet our
 
enthusiasm for this social view lead us to accepting social
 
construction ofknowledge as something good in itself"(171). Social
 
construction ofknowledge must be questioned and examined closely
 
to be vibrant and enabling. Meyers makes the point that consensus
 
may notreflect "reality" and that composition practioners need "to
 
decide whether the groups in our classes are introducing students to
 
new communities,or are confining them in ideologocal structures"
 
(166-167). In other words,teaching collaborative learning can
 
reinforce the exclusionary nature ofdiscourse communities,or
 
collaborative groups can become so inclusive that they are not
 
capable of generating any meaningful knowledge. Meyersand Harris
 
are responding to afear offoundationalism that the word
 
community,when used in discourse community,could denote ifthe
 
collaborative process does not avail itself ofthe continual and well-

examined socialconstruction ofknowledge. In addition to Meyers
 
and Harris,Marilyn Cooper also wams ofthis non-generative
 
exclusion that can take place in discourse communities in her well
 
titled article,"Why Are We Talking About Discourse Communities?
 
Or,Foundationalism Rears Its Ugly Head Once More."
 
Part ofthe foundational problem is what Kenneth Burke calls
 
the "terministic screen"(Grammar59). Edward Schiappa,a social
 
constructionist, melds this Burkean concept with Kuhn's idea ofa
 
paradigm. Schiappa writes,"Once a given discourse community(such
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as an academic discipline)employs a particular set ofterms
 
consistently overtime to describe particular aspects ofexperience,
 
the terms tend to perform a filter-like function by directing attention
 
to some aspects ofthe'objects' under study and not to others"(415).
 
If this continues,the discourse community will bring itself to crisis,
 
and eventually toa paradigm shift, because of its insularity. A
 
vibrant discourse community mustengage in what Bruffee,Fish,and
 
Rorty call abnormal discourse,that is knowledge making and
 
knowledge questioning discourse. In other words,a vibrant
 
discourse community is epistemic,and that means anti-foundational.
 
Yeteven anti-foundationalists find themselves in the
 
uncomfortable position ofrepresenting the academic discourse
 
community,which to students from the outside can seem
 
foundational and exclusionary. Despite that,Patricia Bizzell in
 
"Beyond Anti-Foundationalism" sees this hegemonic stance as an
 
opportunity to reshape the university into an anti-foundational and
 
progressive institution, yet still short ofa nihilistic post-modem
 
nowhere. She calls for the following:
 
"I can invite everyone tojoin seriously in a rhetorical process
 
for articulating an alternative to which many of us can agree.
 
This process will be arisky business; it will require arguing
 
about what we should read and write,arguing about what
 
canon we want to endorse instead ofpretending we can will
 
away the power ofcanons. It will require ideological avowals
 
very uncongenial to anti-foundationalist philosophers. ButI'm
 
just not willing to concede yet that the smirk ofskepticism is
 
all we academics,or we Americans,can achieve in the face of
 
the present crisis in our communal life"(674).
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Bizzeil's point of view represents the feeling ofthe various
 
movements in composition that have created curricula within
 
feminism,multi-culturalism,and writing across the curriculum
 
programs,vibrant and meaningful programs,but programs that are
 
often not understood or supported. Forinstance,David R.Russell
 
points out that writing across the curriculum not only supports the
 
anti-foundational view inherentin generative discourse
 
communities,but also that its structure threatens the foundational
 
power that the university,or its academic discourse community,
 
wants to maintain. Socially contructed discourse communities
 
inherently involve change,and that change can be threatening
 
particularly for those who feel they are excluded by the community's
 
discourse. Russell continues:
 
"Cross-currcular writing instruction has never made a
 
permanentimpasse on academiafortwo structural reasons.
 
First,it resisted the fundamental organizing principle of
 
modem academia,the compartmentalization ofknowledge.
 
Second it upset the usual methods ofregulating access to
 
coveted social roles by challenging the convenient assumption
 
that writing is a single,generalizable skill,learned(or not
 
learned)outside a disciplinary matrix"(Russell 53).
 
As we have seen though,the ideal ofa uniform academic
 
discourse community has been broken down into so many areas that
 
writing across the curriculum can only begin to address all the
 
epistemological and pedagogicalconcerns. Discourse, particularly
 
academic discourse,is anything but constant and uniform,and the
 
university is a perfect example ofthe variety of truths and ways of
 
making knowledge that exist.
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Yet to the freshman student^ who has no epistemic instructor to
 
aid in acquiring the discourse ofthe various disciplines,it does not
 
seem that way. The university can be a monolith ofexclusion,and
 
this exclusionary tension must befought against by an epistemic and
 
inclusionary curriculum. Hence my thesis for this chapter: the
 
foundational and exclusionary tension limits, but the anti-

foundational and inclusionary tension enables.
 
If discourse communities becomefoundational and their
 
normal discourse goes unquestioned,a tension emerges,a tension
 
that many composition practitioners have become aware ofand have
 
tried to loosen with the interjection ofabnormal discourse that caii
 
create knowledge and/or a paradigm shift. A foundational discourse
 
proves to be excluding because anyone who has not mastered the
 
normal discourse will not be allowed to enter. A discourse
 
community thatengagesin both foundational-normal discourse and
 
anti-foundational-abnormal discourse will be a moreinclusionary
 
than exclusionary discoursecommunity because people within and
 
on the margins ofthe discourse community can use the abnormal
 
discourse as an avenue ofentrance or for knowledge creation
 
through the influences of both. In fact,finding a balance,and
 
consequently a productive tension,between inclusion and exclusion
 
81
 
will make the most vibrant and generative discourse community.3
 
An established "discourse community is a way ofregulating
 
who has access to resources,power,even to discourse itself,and it
 
creates gatekeepers to make sure that the right people get in and all
 
others are excluded," writes Marilyn Cooper(205). Cooper continues,
 
"Theconcept ofdiscourse community is like the concepts ofStandard
 
English and cultural literacy"(205). Ifdiscourse is left unexamined,
 
this is true,so an enabling role thatepistemic rhetoric musttake is to
 
examine these discourse communities and understand their
 
exclusionary nature so that they can be made more inclusionary if
 
desired. Marilyn Cooper calls this"a hermeneutic rather than a
 
foundational way"oflooking at discourse communities(205). This
 
hermeneutic quality is representative of both the knowledge making
 
quality ofdiscourse communities and the dialectic that exists in
 
epistemic rhetoric, both in its history and in its constant self-

definition. AsI demonstrated in chapter two,Nietzsche went back to
 
the Platonic dialogues to show us that the foundational/anti­
foundationaldialectic,and not the ethical/unethical dialectic, was at
 
the heart ofrhetoric. Since Nietzsche,Foucault and others have
 
3 Takefor the example the different discourse used by Congress and the C.LA.
 
Congress has both normal and abnormal discourse and the country as a whole can feel
 
relatively included in the political debate. The C.LA runs on a code ofexclusionary
 
normal discourse,and the public and even Congress have difficulty finding entry in the
 
discourse ofthe C.LA.in order to debate it's purpose and outcomes. The C.LA has little
 
tolerance for abnormal discourse. The C.LA.has a restricted and foundational discourse,
 
whereas Congress has an evolving and anti-foundational discourse.
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brought us forward to further understand thatsame dynamic in
 
greater depth. Discourse communities,as part ofthat legacy,and as
 
the touchstone ofmodem epistemic rhetoric,represent that dialectic,
 
a dialectic that ifleft unexamined will bring us back to a
 
foundational way ofthinking,knowing,and exercising power.
 
BeyondHegemony in Discourse Communities
 
Scholarship thatexamines this hegemony is coming from
 
people who are both inside and outside of traditional academic
 
discourse. In my opinion though,the mostinteresting work has
 
comefrom the points of view offeminist writers and people ofcolor,
 
groups that have deeply experienced their exclusion from the truth
 
and powerclaims ofour predominantly white patriarchal culture.
 
Forinstance,David Theo Goldberg demonstrates how racist
 
discourse is sociallyformed. "In a field ofdiscourse like racism what
 
is generally circulated and exchanged is notsimply truth, but Cruth
 
claims or representations. These representations draw their efficacy
 
from traditions,conventions,institutions,and tacit modes of mutual
 
comprehension"(298). AsPlato was aware,any discourse,including
 
racist discourse,rises out of values,and as these values change so
 
does the discourse. Racist discourse will try to hide under the guise
 
offoundational values,but as Goldberg points out,it's through anti-

foundational and multi-cultural understandings that racism can be
 
exposed. "Tosucceed in dissolving racist discourse,then the
 
opposition mustassume suitably diverseforms"(313). Epistemic
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rhetoric,as a questioning and knowledge creating rhetoric, provides
 
the intellectual understanding and heuristics to resist racism and
 
otherforms ofhegemony.
 
Discourse communities see power comingfrom the bottom up,
 
each community creating its own epistemological and power
 
structure. Forfeminism,especially in relation to the bottom up
 
geneaological theories ofFoucault,an understanding ofdiscourse
 
communitiescan give awareness to the primarily productive, but
 
also repressive,aspects of power as played outin language. In other
 
words,a discourse community represents will to power in action.
 
Consequently discourse analysis gives feminists,or any groups that
 
have been marginalized,a way to understand,resist, or change the
 
power structure exhibited in the discourse,a way to fight back
 
against will to truth in action. Language has become one ofthe major
 
vehicles for social change within the feminist movement. Maybe this
 
is why Stanley Fish feels thatfeminism has "energized more thought
 
and social action than any other'ism'in the past twenty or thirty
 
years,including Marxism"(Olson 265).
 
Yetin feminist epistemic rhetoric there also exists the
 
foundational and anti-foundational tension. As Jana Sawicki points
 
outin "Foucault and Feminism: Towards a Politics of Difference,"
 
universalizing women and women's experiences undermines
 
progressive efforts,since power rests in the differences of women
 
(32). Sawicki's anti-essentialist argument asserts that universalizing
 
women is reverting women's thinking back to a foundational
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feminism. Foundationalism,at least in its patriarchal displays,has
 
brought the repression of women. Foucault writes that the
 
differences amongst people,the anti-foundational realities ofthe
 
world,	represent the true bottom up structure. Sawicki writes:
 
In short,genealogy as resistance involves using history to give
 
voice to the marginal and submerged voices which lie 'a little
 
beneath history'- the voices ofthe mad,the delinquent,the
 
abnormal,the disempowered. It locates many discontinuous
 
and regional struggles against power both in the past and
 
present. These voices are the sources ofresistance,the c
 
reative subjects ofhistory.(28)
 
Discourse communities and epistemic rhetoric, giving light to anti-

foundational differences,can both resist the repression thatcomes
 
from essentializing, universalizing,and creating foundations for
 
normalcy and hence repression.
 
It's no coincidence that contemporary epistemic rhetoric's post-

modem resurgence has been articulated during the civil rights and
 
feminist movements. The political power thatepistemic rhetoric can
 
assertshould make it clearer now why James Berlin perfers an
 
ideological definition ofepistemic rhetoric over a Fulkerson-like
 
theoretical one. Epistemic rhetoric is a way for composition
 
practitioners to understand and resist the limiting effects of
 
language,as wellas understand and use the enabling effects of
 
language,since epistemic rhetoric is inevitably ideological and
 
political.
 
Gregory Clark,a proponentof discourse community theory,
 
argues that we must deal directly with the exclusionary tensions in
 
discourse communities if we are to ethically and democratically teach
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reading and writing: "The political assumptions that underlie the
 
rhetoric ofthe discourse community as it has been articulated in
 
composition studies during the last decade seem to support
 
democracy in principle, yet tend to undermine itin practice"(61). If
 
Clark is right,epistemic rhetoric,a rhetoric that is knowledge
 
creating and aware ofthe legacy of will to truth and will to power
 
within language,is in danger ofencouraging non-participatory
 
practices that it has struggled so hard to become aware of. Clark
 
feels that this is true because,"It does so by denying the presence of
 
unresolved conflict,and denying in the process equal participation in
 
the discourse to those who disagree"(61). Agreement,therefore,can
 
not be the only basis ofa truly participatory discourse community,
 
because in disagreement knowledge is found. Butthis knowledge
 
making through disagreement can tear a discourse community apart.
 
Keeping the feeling ofcommunity within this tension,a productive
 
tension that balances inclusionary/anti-foundational and
 
exclusionary/foundational forces,takes a different ethical and
 
epistemological point of view,a point of view that encourages"a
 
politics ofdifference"(63). Clark writes:
 
"The discourse I am describing here renders the progress of
 
expertise in a community secondary to a relational and
 
epistemological practice ofconfronting differences so that its
 
participants can come to understand how the beliefs and
 
purposes of others can call their own into question ... This is the
 
only agreement that supports a democratic discourse of
 
community. A classroom reconstructed along these lines would
 
situate the development ofexpertise in writing and reading,or
 
in anything else, within this agreement to rescue the discourse
 
ofcommunity from domination and exclusion"(73).
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An epistemic classroom that can do this and retain its sense of
 
history can rise to Clark's call.
 
In "Discourse on Language"Foucault demonstrates how difficult
 
entry into a discourse community can be. He describes this sense of
 
exclusion as the "I" being trapped between "Inclination" and
 
"Institution" Thatis, the self doesn't know where to start in the river
 
ofdiscourse that has been placed before it by the powers that be.
 
KurtSpellmeyer makes an ingenious reading of this difficult Foucault
 
piece in "Foucault and the Freshman Writer: Considering the Selfin
 
Discourse." Discourse is more often than not seen by young writers
 
as exclusionary. Young writers can feel that exclusionary tension,
 
but usually can't put it into the language ofthe discourse they are
 
being excluded by. For many students this seems like a traditional
 
rite ofpassage or possibly a game;they must adapt to the discourse
 
because the initiate has always adapted notthecommunity. Yet by
 
giving the students the discourse to understand its exclusionary
 
power,the studentscan reverse the"game"and use thatsame
 
exclusionary discourse to enter,to make it inclusionary. "Foucault
 
maintains ... we speak first,and then leam what we have said and
 
whom we have become"(Spellmeyer 723). This is a friendly way to
 
use Foucaultin the writing class,a way that epistemic rhetoric would
 
enable. An epistemic classroom would have the students use the
 
discourse,find the meaning in their writing,and worry later,
 
possibly in revision and portfolio use, whether that discourse is
 
appropriate for entry.
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Does each epistemic composition practitioner need to create
 
theirown curriculum from scratch and tie in all these pedagogical
 
and epistemologicalissues into a perfect web? No. Epistemic
 
rhetoric is continually in the process ofsocial construction,and
 
pedagogical help is continually being written. There is a lot of
 
support to befound,and continual possibilities existfor collaboration
 
with the vibrant and knowledge generating epistemic rhetoric
 
discourse community. Forinstance,in the English and composition
 
journals there is a lot ofsupport to befound. Across the nation there
 
are English and composition faculties that subscribe to the epistemic
 
rhetoric theory. And there are many studentcentered composition
 
textbooks that represent the epistemic stance. To list afew: Waysof
 
Reading by Bartholmae and Petrosky,Inquiry by Bloom and White,
 
TheInformedReader by Bazerman,The St. Martin's Guide To
 
Writing by Axelrod and Cooper,Forming,Thinking, Writing by
 
Berthoff,and Style:An Anti-Textbook by Lanham. For those
 
composition practioners who are not already part ofthe epistemic
 
rhetoric discourse community,entrance can easily be made available.
 
Foucaultsums up the thoughts of most anyone trying to enter a
 
discourse community,including a composition practitioner trying to
 
enter the epistemic rhetoric discourse community,asfollows:
 
"In a society such as our own we all know the rules of
 
exclusion. The most obvious and familiar ofthese concerns is
 
whatis prohibited. Weknow perfectly well that we are not
 
free to sayjust anything,that we cannot simply speak ofjust
 
anything. We have three types of prohibition,covering objects,
 
ritual with its surrounding circumstances,the privileged or
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exclusive right to speak ofa particular subject; these
 
prohibitions interrelate,reinforce and complementeachother,
 
forming acomplex web,continually subject to modification. I
 
will note simply that the areas where this web is most tightly
 
woven today,where the danger spots are most numerous,are
 
those dealing with politics and sexuality"(The Discourse on
 
Language 216).
 
Conclusion
 
As discussed above,epistemic rhetoric is political, and its
 
ideology is busy unweaving the web ofrepression through such
 
examples as anti-racist and feminist discourse. It is doing this in
 
standard composition classrooms where the teachers are epistemic
 
rhetoricians,and it is doing this in writing across the curriculum
 
programs that are institutionalizing the theory ofdiverse and anti-

foundational discourse communities. The legacy ofinfluence,thatI
 
believe epistemic rhetoric will create in contemporary composition
 
studies,is a legacy ofcontinual self-definition,or continual
 
knowledge creation. Within an ethos ofinclusion over exclusion,
 
inclusion enables the studentreader and writer instead oflimiting
 
him or her. Epistemic rhetoric will continue to embody the dialectic
 
oftruth and its relationship to language,a truth that was onceseen
 
dominantly as foundational and exclusionary,and is now seen as
 
anti-foundational and inclusionary. Its history has been long,and its
 
continuing legacy will remain influential,I believe, whether it is
 
called epistemic rhetoric or not.
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